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ABSTRACT

Today’s technology standards are the result of an
extraordinary amount of innovation, collaboration and
competition. These concepts are interrelated, and each is enhanced
or enabled by intellectual property. Where these three concepts
come together in standards development, it is unsurprising that
antitrust concerns are also present. Specifically, the interests of
contributors, participants, and implementers must be fairly
balanced to ensure that the appropriate types and levels of
innovation, collaboration, and competition can occur—and that the
public will benefit. It is important that antitrust enforcement
involving standards development organizations and owners of
standards essential patents recognize the careful balance of these
three concepts. If antitrust enforcement elevates one goal—say
competition—at the expense of collaboration and innovation, or if
one set of actors in the standards development ecosystem—for
example, implementers—is preferred over the other actors, there
will likely be devastating effects on the standards development
ecosystem.
The tension between innovation, collaboration, and
competition in the standards development arena, as well as the
divergent interests of contributors, participants, and implementers
are not new. Between 2015 and 2019, however, the viewpoints of
the FTC and DOJ diverged in how they handled the tension. This
paper argues that we must look carefully at the underlying policies
driving the agencies’ behavior: both the outmoded viewpoints that
the FTC is pressing as well as the innovation-positive perspective
that has shaped the DOJ’s actions in recent years. By amplifying
the modern perspective and focusing on creating the right
incentives for the right reasons, future imbalances that harm
innovation, collaboration, and competition in the standards world
can be avoided.
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History has shown that time and market forces provide equilibrium
in balancing interests, whether the new technology is a video recorder, a
personal computer, or now the Net. – Steve Blank 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Technology standards are typically developed by standards
development organizations (SDOs), 2 comprised of innovative companies
working together to collaboratively solve technological problems, such as
interoperability or interconnectivity. 3 Some companies participating in an
SDO may submit technology they developed to be considered for
incorporation into the standard (contributors or innovators), while other
companies participate by sharing their knowledge and being part of the
problem-solving process (participants). 4 After a standard is developed,
companies that manufacture products or provide infrastructure for these
products (implementers) use the technical specifications of the standard
to ensure their goods and services will interoperate with other
implementers’ goods and services. Technology standards are the result of
innovation, collaboration, and competition amongst these groups—
contributors, participants, and implementers.
Innovation, collaboration, and competition do not happen in a
vacuum. Not only are they interrelated concepts, but each is enhanced or
enabled by intellectual property. Innovation is driven by intellectual
property rights that provide an inventive company with exclusive rights

1. Steve Blank, Why The Movie Industry Can’t Innovate and the Result is SOPA,
STEVEBLANK.COM (January 4, 2012), https://steveblank.com/2012/01/04/why-the-movie-industrycant-innovate-and-the-result-is-sopa/ [https://perma.cc/C6ZG-WMKK].
2. Although the terms “standards setting organizations (SSOs)” and “standards development
organizations (SDOs)” are often used interchangeably, I will use the term SDO in this paper to better
connote the perspective that these companies are not just determining the technology standards, but
are innovating and developing the very technology that forms the heart of technology standards. I
appreciate Ron Katznelson’s suggestion that SDO is a more apt term.
3. Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua D. Wright, Intellectual Property & Standard Setting, 17
THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY REVIEW 52, 52 (2016) (describing SDOs as “private organizations that
develop technical and other standards through a collaborative and consensus driven process that
balances the varied interests of industry participants, which include both producers and potential users
of technology”).
4. Lisa Kimmel, Standards, Patent Policies, and Antitrust: A Critique of IEEE-II, 29
ANTITRUST ABA 18, 18 (2015).
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in its invention for a limited time. 5 During this period of exclusive rights,
the innovative company may be able to recoup some of its research and
development costs, either by being the only company to sell the
technology or by licensing the right to make, use, or sell that technology
to other companies. 6 Collaboration is made possible by intellectual
property rights. 7 Companies are more willing to work together to innovate
and contribute their respective technology to a collaborative effort if they
know their individual contributions are protected by intellectual
property. 8 Many of these collaborations include some sort of agreement
between the companies regarding the ownership and use of the
contributed, as well as jointlydeveloped, technology. 9 Competition
stimulates innovation, and intellectual property rights ensure there will be
dynamic competition amongst the various actors in a market. 10
Standardization is one area where innovation, collaboration, and
competition come together, supported often by intellectual property
rights. 11
Because of the importance of innovation, collaboration, and
competition in standards development, it is not surprising that antitrust
concerns are also present. 12 Specifically, the interests of contributors,
participants, and implementers must be fairly balanced to ensure
appropriate types and levels of innovation, collaboration, and competition
can occur. Moreover, standards development encompasses both a
horizontal cooperative relationship between contributors and participants
(to promote collaboration), as well as concomitant vertical agreements
5. David J. Kappos, The Antitrust Assault on Intellectual Property, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
665, 666–67 (2018) (explaining how intellectual property rights “incentivize innovation on multiple
levels”).
6. Clark D. Asay, Patent Schisms, 104 IOWA L. REV. 46, 67–68 (2018) (describing various
ways companies can leverage their patent rights to recoup research and development investments).
7. Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in the Current Context, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 897, 909–911 (“Armed with a patent as a transferable asset, inventors can more
efficiently work with commercializers and collaborators.”).
8. Id. (“Similarly, patent protection allows technology firms to collaborate with one another
through joint [research and development] by reducing the risk of misappropriation and minimizing
the need for costly contracting.”).
9. Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281,
309–310 (2016).
10. Shubha Ghosh, Intellectual Property Rights: The View from Competition Policy, 103 NW.
L. REV. 344, 346 (2009).
11. See Kesan, supra note 7, at 918–19 (describing standardization activities by SDOs as an
effective collaboration to produce innovative solutions).
12. David M. Schneck, Setting the Standard: Problems Presented to Patent Holders
Participating in the Creation of Industry Uniformity Standards, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
641, 655 (1998).
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between contributors and implementers. Outside of the standardization
context, these contributors, participants, and implementers would often be
considered competitors. 13 As such, antitrust enforcement in the standards
realm must carefully balance the goals of innovation, collaboration, and
competition and should recognize that while there is often a sense of
tension between these goals, heightened innovation can be a sign of and a
benefit for fair competition. 14 If instead, antitrust enforcement elevates
one goal at the expense of the others or places the interests of one of the
groups ahead of the others, there may be devastating impacts on the
standards development ecosystem. Specifically, if antitrust enforcement
places too high a premium on competition, or favors one of the parties,
such as implementers, over the contributors and participants, standards
development is likely to suffer.
While there is a particular tension between innovation, collaboration,
and competition in the standards development arena, it is definitely not
new. The two agencies charged with enforcing competition policy in the
United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department
of Justice, Antitrust Division (DOJ), have long wrestled with promoting
both innovation and competition, as well as understanding how
collaboration can enhance these ideas.15 Although the policies regarding
innovation, competition, and collaboration have historically bounced
around, when considering standardized technology, both the FTC and
DOJ have recently shifted the balance in favor of implementers and acted
in ways that created impediments to innovation (and thus competition and
collaboration) in the standards development area.16
In the last few years, however, the viewpoints of these two agencies
have diverged on these topics. The FTC continues to rely on outdated
perspectives and theories that have been called into question. In doing so,
the FTC has favored implementers over contributors in ways that are
harmful to innovation. Some examples of this include pursuing
unsubstantiated antitrust claims and pressing outdated legal arguments
against SDO innovators. 17 On the other hand, the DOJ has recently
recognized that its previously-held viewpoints are obsolete. In the last few
years the DOJ has been actively seeking to reset the balance between
competition and innovation, between innovator and implementer. Some
13.
14.
(2018).
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Gregory Day, Innovative Antitrust and the Patent System, 96 NEB. L. REV. 829, 831–33
Id. at 840–43.
See infra II.
See infra III.b.
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examples of this include the December 2019 Joint Policy Statement on
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND
Commitments, issued in conjunction with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), as well as a letter issued in September 2020 intended
to correct misunderstandings that had arisen from an earlier DOJ letter. 18
While it seems that the DOJ has restored the right level of balance to
promote innovation, collaboration, and competition, particularly in the
field of standardized technology, it is important that this movement in the
right direction does not stop here. First, the importance of standards is
only growing as technology becomes more interconnected with all aspects
of our lives. Second, while the FTC’s actions have generally been limited
to hindering the innovative activities of just a few contributors, the scope
of the claims they have alleged against these innovators could be
extremely detrimental if applied broadly. Third, as is always the case,
agency priorities are subject to change with different leadership and in the
case of a new administration. Given the results of the recent presidential
election, many shifts are occurring at the top of the DOJ and the FTC,
which could lead to undoing all of the positive steps that have been taken
by the DOJ. For these reasons, it is critical to look carefully at the
underlying policies driving the agencies’ behavior, both the outmoded
viewpoints that the FTC is pressing as well as the innovation-positive
perspective that has shaped the DOJ’s actions in recent years. By
amplifying the modern perspective and focusing on creating the right
incentives for the right reasons, future imbalances that harm innovation,
collaboration, and competition in the standards world can be avoided.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section I will explain the
divergent interests of innovators and implementers in the SDO space, in
part by describing the various roles these two different groups play in the
world of standardized technology as well as the various costs and benefits
each face. This section will also discuss the enhanced levels of innovation
and competition that arise out of standardization and standardized
technology and explain how, to achieve these advantages, the interests of
innovators and implementers have been balanced. Finally, this section
closes by looking at assertions that the system is currently out of whack
or imbalanced. Section II will describe how the FTC and the DOJ
participate in the SDO space and have impacted the balance between
innovators and implementers. After looking at how these institutions have
historically affected the SDO space, this section continues by detailing
18. See infra III.a.
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both direct actions and indirect actions, taken by the FTC and the DOJ,
that have been part of shifting the SDO space balance in favor of
implementers. Finally, this section will explore the after-effects and
impacts these actions have had on the SDO space and beyond. Section III
explains why, for the sake of the desired innovation, collaboration, and
competition, it is time to follow the DOJ’s lead. Specifically, over the last
few years, the DOJ has taken a number of steps that have the potential to
put the SDO space back into balance. In contrast, the FTC persists in
holding outdated ideas and continues to create, or at least protect, the
imbalance between innovators and implementers. After illustrating these
two different viewpoints, the paper concludes by explaining why now, in
particular, is the right moment to focus on returning balance to the SDO
space.
II.

THE DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN INNOVATORS AND
IMPLEMENTERS

“Conflict and opposition are as necessary as cooperation and
agreement, but the scale is off balance, with conflict and opposition
overweighted.” – Deborah Tannen 19
Although we may not recognize it, we are surrounded by
standardized technology. 20 As we move from the information economy to
the Internet of Things, the presence of standards becomes even more
ubiquitous. But standards are not developed overnight. Instead, standards
are the products of years of innovative, collaborative, and competitive
activity. 21 The best standards are generally those that were created by a
robust and diverse group of contributors and participants, deciding
amongst a wide selection of possible technologies. In the same vein, the
most successful standards are those that are widely adopted and promoted
by implementers. 22 This requires a careful balancing of rights and
19. DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: STOPPING AMERICA’S WAR OF WORDS
(1998).
20. Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 63 KAN. L. REV. 279,
302 (2015) (aptly noting that “standards are everywhere”).
21. For just one example of the lengthy standardization process, the development of the 3G
wireless communication standard, see Justus Baron & Kirti Gupta, Unpacking 3GPP Standards, 27
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 433, 436–38 (January 2018) (describing the history of mobile network
development from the 1980s to present).
22. Note by the United States, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting, OECD, Dec. 8, 2014
at 3, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD
(2014)116&doclanguage=en, at 3 [https://perma.cc/XF4U-66TE] (“[T]he most successful standards
are often those that provide timely, widely adopted, and effective solutions to technical problems.”).
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obligations between contributors, participants, and implementers. To
grasp the positions of the FTC and DOJ with respect to the standards
space, it is important to first have an understanding of the opposing
interests of contributors and implementers and how innovation,
collaboration, and competition have generally been protected by the
balance. This section will explain the interests of the various parties
involved in standard setting, as well as why these interests are naturally
divergent. Next, this section will explore how these interests are typically
balanced in the standards development space and why the efforts to do so
are worth the candle. Finally, this section will examine assertions that,
despite efforts to balance the interests of contributors and implementers,
there is a significant imbalance that must be corrected and then will
explain how these assertions have been widely questioned.
A. Divergent Interests in the SDO Space
To understand why contributors and implementers have divergent
interests, it helps to know generally how standards are created and
adopted, as well as the roles that each of the parties play in the standards
development space. This section will briefly explain the standardization
process, before detailing the interests of the innovators and implementers.
A standard is “any set of technical specifications which either does
or is intended to provide a common design for a product or process” and
is related to characteristics such as quality, safety, or interoperability. 23
While standards may be set by the government or by market choice, the
technology standards relevant to this paper are those developed by SDOs.
SDOs are “voluntary collectives in which representatives from multiple
private companies, who are often competitors of each other, work together
to establish technology standards.” 24 Standards developed by SDOs
include many technologies we rely on and take for granted today,
including Wi Fi, 4G, MPEG, and USB.
Although each SDO may have slightly different mechanisms,
standards development generally proceeds as follows. SDOs are generally
formed around a technical problem to be solved—for example, how can
we best compress video for streaming or how can we best implement a
wireless local area network. This large technical problem is then
23. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, Christopher R. Leslie & Michael A.
Carrier, 2 IP & ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, 35-3, 35-4 (3d ed. 2020).
24. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRANDS Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and
Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 237 (2014).
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subdivided into various components and assigned to working groups.
Each working group includes representatives from contributors (or
innovators), as well as participants; these people are usually engineers or
technical specialists. The working group debates and considers a myriad
of sub-issues and desired functions related to their assigned component of
the larger problem. Contributors submit technological proposals (known
as contributions), consisting of technical specifications and details, related
to any open issue or functionality being developed by the SDO. 25 The
relevant working group will then review and evaluate the submitted
contributions to try to solve each issue and implement each function. 26 It
is common for hundreds of these contributions to be submitted and
discussed in the process of developing a single feature of a much larger
standard. 27 The working group, through a series of iterative and
collaborative discussions, may accept, reject, or seek changes to the
submitted technology proposals, in an effort to determine the optimal set
of technologies to implement each of the relevant aspects or functions in
its area. 28 After the working group has selected the optimal contributions
to address each open issue and desired function, these are generally
presented to a larger subgroup for that technical area of the standard,
resulting in additional collaboration and iterative discussion. 29 This
process often takes years, and, even after a standard is developed,
improvements may continue to be proposed and discussed.
The result of this lengthy process, ideally, is a technology standard
that provides numerous benefits to contributors, participants, and
implementers, as well as to consumers who use and enjoy products based
on standardized technology. 30 Contributors and participants benefit from
their active involvement in the SDO process that allows them to influence
the direction and outcome of standard development. 31 Contributors and
participants may also be able to more quickly ramp-up for the design and
manufacture of standards-compliant products or receive other training or

25. Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless Industry, 22
GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 878 (2015).
26. Id.
27. Baron & Gupta, supra note 21.
28. See Gupta, supra note 25, at 866.
29. Id.
30. The benefits listed here are the most relevant to this paper; however, other benefits accrue
to contributors, participants, implementers, and the public. See Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Ignorance
Over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological
Progress, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 159, 166–170 (2018).
31. Andrew Updegrove, The Essential Guide to Standards, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG § 1.2,
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/participating1.php [https://perma.cc/X5CB-MMPA].
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certification in the standard from the SDO. 32 If a contributor’s technology
is selected for incorporation into the standard, the company may realize a
potential income stream from licensing that technology to implementers.
Implementers, which may include SDO contributors and participants, are
able to realize a marketable product more quickly, at a lower cost, and via
a more simplified design process because the specifications and technical
data for the product are already provided by the standard. 33 Moreover,
implementers face less risk that their product will be rejected by the public
than if they had developed and introduced a product independently. 34
Finally, consumers benefit particularly from interoperability and
interconnectivity made possible by standardization. 35
The benefits described above are necessary to offset the costs and
risks associated with SDO participation. These costs are largely borne by
SDO contributors and participants and are comprised of monetary and
time costs. 36 Membership in an SDO typically costs $10,000 to $60,000,
although a few SDOs have dues ranging upwards from $200,000 to $1
million. 37 Additional costs of participation include person-hours
necessary to prepare for and attend SDO meetings. 38 Contributors face
additional costs associated with the research and development (R&D)
required to invent and document technology to submit to an SDO for
consideration. 39 This R&D expenditure by a contributor is spent at
considerable risk to the innovative company. By design, contributors
compete within the SDO for their technology to be selected; this is a
feature of SDOs, allowing the “best” solution to be selected from a range
of possible technologies. However, it means that not all technology is
selected and thus, contributors may have invested in a developing
technology that will never be commercialized. Contributors are also
32. Id.; Robert L. Stoll, What You Should Know About US Standard-Essential Patents, LAW360
(Sept. 25, 2013, 6:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articls/472229/what-you-should-know-aboutus-standard-essential-patents [https://perma.cc/8NF8-A5XF]
33. Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete
Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 793 (2014).
34. James C. De Vellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the Rights of Patent Holders
with the Need for Industry-Wide Standards, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 301, 305 (2003).
35. See Wright, supra note 33, at 805–06.
36. See Osenga, supra note 30, at 170–71 (describing additional disadvantages of
standardization).
37. See Updegrove, supra note 31, at § 4.2.1.
38. Id.
39. Jonathan M. Barnett, Antitrust Overreach: Undoing Cooperative Standardization in the
Digital Economy, 25 MICH. TECH. L.REV. 163 (2019) (explaining that an SDO contributor “incurs
substantial R&D costs starting several years prior to finalization of the standard-setting process, under
substantial uncertainty concerning which standard will ultimately be selected or the commercial
applications of the selected standard”).
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making a choice between participating in the standardization process and
retaining their market exclusivity through proprietary behavior. Although
the ability to license patents covering the standardized technology may
offset some of these costs, the risks are substantial. 40
Given the expenses faced by the contributor in developing
technology to contribute to the SDO, as well as the costs of participation
itself, it is natural for a contributor to want to license its technology to
implementers on terms that allow the contributor to recoup some of these
expenditures. Of course, the contributor would also like widespread
adoption of the standard that incorporates its technology, again to
maximize its ability to recapture some of its investments but also as a
matter of technical reputation, so the contributor faces constraints on these
licensing terms to ensure extensive use. On the other hand, the
implementer—a company making and selling products and networks
based on standardized technology—would prefer to pay as little as
possible to license that technology to maximize its profits. Neither of these
interests are wrong; in fact, they are completely natural and likely within
the realm of any particular company’s duties. 41 However, the interests of
the contributor and implementer are clearly at odds.
B. The How and the Why of Balancing These Interests
In some respects, given the opposing views of the contributor and
implementer, it would seem simpler to forego standardization
altogether—or at least, let it play out—in which case the difficulties would
seem likely to quash standards development naturally. The efforts to
balance the interests of contributors and implementers impose costs of
their own. However, there are very good reasons to work to balance these
interests—involving innovation, collaboration, and competition. This
section will discuss how SDOs have attempted to balance the divergent
interests of contributors and implementers to facilitate standardization,
before exploring the benefits attributed to standardization that make these
efforts worthwhile.
1. Provisions to Balance Innovators and Implementers Interests
Because standardization is an expensive, lengthy, and uncertain
process, contributors often rely on intellectual property rights to protect
40. Id.
41. Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law,
27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3 (2019). In fact, both innovators and implementers “likely have
fiduciary obligations” to seek their preferred royalty scheme; id.
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the technology they develop and submit to the SDO. Both within and
outside the standardization process, from an economic standpoint, patents
provide an exclusive right to “address the public goods nature of
inventions that are expensive to produce but easy to appropriate.”42
Patents that cover and are required to practice standardized technology are
known as standard essential patents, or SEPs.43 While patent rights
facilitate innovation, collaboration, and competition, and thus may
incentivize SDO contributors and participants to engage in standards
development, the exclusive rights associated with patent ownership are
seemingly at odds with the goal of widespread adoption of any technology
standard. 44 This is where SDO intellectual property rights (IPR) policies
step in to help make possible a balance between the divergent interests of
contributors and implementers. 45 Two common IPR policies include
requiring disclosure of patents covering technology that is under
consideration for incorporation into a standard and requiring contributors
to make FRAND commitments for incorporated technology. 46 These
policies promote a balance of rights and responsibilities between
contributors and implementers that achieves both the robust SDO
participation necessary to develop solid technological standards and the
widespread adoption that is indicative of a successful standard.
Most SDOs have some form of disclosure requirement as part of their
IPR policies. 47 Specifically, contributors are required to disclose whether
they hold patents (or have pending patent applications) that cover the

42. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580
(2003). Other scholars have provided additional justifications for patents, including moral rights. See,
e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549,
1559 (2003).
43. SEPs are “technologically essential patents” or patents that cover technology required to
practice the standard as a technical, not a commercial matter. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 24, at
240 (citing ETSI definition of “essential”).
44. See, e.g., Robert P. Feldman, Maura L. Rees, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Brent
Townshend, The Effect of Industry Standard Setting on Patent Licensing and Enforcement, IEEE
COMM. MAG., July 2000, at 112 (“The ideal of open, widely promulgated standards is at odds with a
patent owner’s right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention . . .
[because this right] would serve to undermine rapid and widespread adoption of the standard, resulting
in reduced value of the standard.”).
45. See, e.g., George S. Cary, Larry C. Work-Dembowski & Paul S. Hayes, Antitrust
Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1241, 1258 (2008) (“[IPR]
policies strike a balance between allowing patent holders to be paid for their innovations and
protecting the implementers of standards from abuse of standardization’s exclusionary power.”).
46. Id.
47. RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A
REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 48 (2013).
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technology they are submitting for consideration. 48 The particulars of
each SDO’s disclosure policy may differ, whether in their definition of
“essential,” whether patents that are optional for practicing the standard
must be disclosed, and at what point in the process these disclosures must
be made. 49 Regardless of the exact requirement, disclosure policies ensure
that SDO members are aware of proprietary technologies when selecting
amongst the technological alternatives. 50 This gives SDOs the opportunity
to select non-proprietary technology alternatives if desired, allowing for
an optimal balancing between contributors and implementers. Moreover,
the disclosure policies help SDOs in implementing the FRAND
commitments that serve as a second piece of this balancing act.
Many SDOs also require contributors to agree to FRAND licensing
of any proprietary technology selected for inclusion in the standard. 51
FRAND licensing commitments are intended to ensure that implementers
are able to use proprietary technology incorporated into a standard on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. 52 While FRAND commitments
have numerous issues, 53 the purpose is to “curb possible attempts [by the
contributor] to exploit the increased market power that comes with
owning a patent that is used in a standard.” 54 FRAND commitments
attempt to level the negotiation field by, first, providing that licensing
terms are commensurate with the types of competitive terms that would
have been applied ex ante, before the technology was incorporated into
the standard, 55 and second, guaranteeing that implementers cannot be
outright denied a license to the technology necessary to practice a
standard. 56 Working in tandem with the disclosure policies, FRAND

48. Anne Layne-Farrar, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights: Assessing the Link Between
Standards and Market Power, 21 ANTITRUST 42, 42 (2007) (noting that contributors “often propose
their own proprietary IP for cooperative standards and patented inventions are frequently implicated.
As a result, the vast majority of formal SSOs . . .request that their members report their patents or
other IP that might be interpreted as ‘essential’ for a standard.”).
49. See Bekkers & Updegrove, supra note 47.
50. Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559,
567–68 (2011).
51. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 24, at 244. In the alternative, some SDOs require royalty-free
or no-cost licensing of patented technology incorporated in a standard.
52. Id. at 233.
53. Id. at 234 (listing five common problems with FRAND).
54. Id. at 238 (citing Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing
Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007).
55. George S. Cary, Larry C. Work-Dembowski, & Paul S. Hayes, Antitrust Implications of
Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1241, 1259–60 (2008).
56. Id. at 1260.
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commitments also help to balance the interests of contributors and
implementers to the benefit of standards development and adoption.
2. Advantages of Standardization
The process of standardization, as described above, plays a
fundamental role in innovation and standardized technology as both
evidence of and a source of additional technological advancement. But
standards also raise concerns, particularly where the technology is
covered by patents. While the IPR policies of disclosure and FRAND
commitments help to ameliorate some concerns, these policies also
impose their own costs on SDO contributors. To understand why the costs
associated with standardization, as well as the additional costs imposed
by IPR policies, are worthwhile, it is helpful to understand, in the grand
scheme, some advantages that are made possible through standardization.
This section will cover three standards-specific advantages: robust
collaborative and competitive innovation; interoperability and
implementer innovation; and follow-on innovation made possible by
standardized technology.
First, SDOs serve as a particular type of joint venture, allowing the
financial resources and intellectual capital of multiple, competitive,
innovative firms to essentially “pool” their resources while they solve a
technological problem. Beyond that, the SDO selects technology from
among this pooled set of resources through a set of iterative, challenging
discussions, intended to hone the technology to an optimal level.
Standards development is a particular type of joint venture. 57 In general,
joint ventures are understood to enhance innovation by reducing the risks
of investments in research and development, achieving economies of
scale, and allowing access to complementary resources.58 Technology
standards reflect the best of this. Contributors are able to pool their own
investments in research and development with those of their innovative
peers. 59 The process of standardization having access to this extraordinary
level of technological innovation, then further enhances innovation
because the SDO activity serves as “the proving ground,” where the “best
engineers in the world” determine the future of various technologies. 60 As
57. Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683, 1695 (2020)
58. Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into
the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583, 591 (1998).
59. Comments of Laurie Self, Qualcomm, in Meeting the Challenges to America’s Economic
Future: Charting the Course in U.S. Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy, 67 CATH. U. L.
REV. 605, 641 (2018).
60. Id.
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one court noted, “One consequence of the standard-setting process is that
SDOs may more readily make an objective comparison between
competing technologies, patent positions, and licensing terms before an
industry becomes locked into a standard.” 61 Moreover, there is
competition amongst SDOs in certain technology areas; here, there is even
greater innovation made possible as each SDO uses the available
resources to try to solve the technological problem first or arrive at a better
solution.
Second, SDOs supercharge innovation through the development of
interoperability and performance standards, incentivizing implementers to
not just adopt these standards, but also create follow-on, complementary,
or competing products that utilize and integrate with the standardized
technology. SDOs develop and set interoperability and performance
standards using new technologies, and further support and facilitate the
adoption of these standards by implementers and ultimately consumers.62
Interoperability encourages incremental innovation, allowing
implementers and even consumers to leverage existing innovative
technology. 63 Barriers to innovation tend to be lowered because
innovations “can take advantage of existing infrastructure and customer
bases.” 64 Further, interoperability promotes widespread access to the
technology, 65 allowing more innovators access to the underlying
technology and infrastructure, especially true in the field of
standardization. Lastly, based on the idea of interoperability, there is
competition and innovation within the standard as implementers strive to
make the most cost-effective, standards-compliant products. 66
Standardization
encourages
horizontal
competition
amongst
implementers, allowing consumers to purchase similar products from
multiple manufacturers at different price points or with varying features
or services. 67
61. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2007).
62. See Wright, supra note 33, at 792.
63. Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1549, 1558 (2009) (“Interoperability encourages certain types of innovation, but can
reduce incentives for others. … Because incremental innovation leverages prior innovative activity,
it typically requires less investment, spurring contributions from a wider variety and greater number
of developers. Not surprisingly, these incremental advances account for the lion’s share of
innovation.”)
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1559.
66. Christopher R. Leslie, The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting
the Standard-Setting Process, 98 OR. L. REV. 379, 392 (2020).
67. Benjamin M. Miller, FRAND-Encumbered SEPs and Injunctions: Why Section 5 of the FTC
Act is an Inappropriate Remedy, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 452, 460–61 (2015).
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Third, the inventive technologies that arise from SDOs themselves
can spur further innovation by enabling new ideas. For example, consider
ridesharing business models like Uber and Lyft; without the emergence of
4G technology, these innovations could not occur. 68 Moreover, the
widespread availability of standardized technology, as noted above,
allows a large number of potential innovators the access necessary to
create these previously impossible inventions. To be fair, some argue that
standardization decreases follow-on innovation due to supracompetitive
pricing serving as a tax; 69 however, the notion of supracompetitive pricing
has its own issues, as described below.
For all of these reasons, standards development is an activity that
essentially elevates inherently valuable research and development done
by innovative firms and takes it to the next level. We recognize the
societal value in inventive and innovative activities in part through the
reward of a patent. Antitrust law, in appreciating that innovation is one of
the axes of competition, has generally made peace with the lesserappealing (from a competition standpoint) aspects of patent law, namely
the right to exclude. Because the innovation that potentially could stem
from standards development activities is even greater, it would seem that
antitrust law could also be reconciled with possible anticompetitive
aspects associated with standardization. Unfortunately, that isn’t the
case. 70
C.

Assertions of Imbalance—Is the System Out of Whack?

Not everyone believes that IPR policies implemented by SDOs are
sufficient to strike the necessary balance. Despite disclosure and FRAND
commitment policies, implementers and many commentators argue that
contributors are unfairly exploiting the intellectual property rights secured
in their SEPs by engaging in patent holdup and royalty stacking, defeating
the procompetitive benefits of standardization. 71 To counteract these
alleged bad behaviors, implementers and commentators have asked for
contributors’ patent rights in SEPs to be diminished. Relevant to this
paper, the FTC and the DOJ have seemed to embrace, and at times
68. See Self comments, supra note 59, at 641.
69. A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments
More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2116 (2018).
70. In some respects, the FTC and the DOJ do “generally approve” of standards development
activities. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition
Policy, at 2 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219784 [https://perma.cc/6AXC-PMZJ].
71. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 2010–2017 (2007).
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promoted, these allegations as well. But taken to a logical conclusion, the
abrogation of patent rights for technology submitted to SDOs would
discourage the best innovators from participating in standards
development, thus impeding innovation, collaboration, and competition
that standardization facilitates.
Despite the pervasiveness of allegations of patent holdup and royalty
stacking, their actual existence and effects seems to have been greatly
overstated. That the FTC and DOJ have acted to “alleviate” patent holdup
and royalty stacking, when these very ideas may not be a real problem,
should cause concern. This section will first explain the theories of patent
holdup and royalty stacking, particularly within the standards
development arena, before reviewing recent work that calls into question
the extent, and in fact, the very existence, of these behaviors.
1. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
Patent holdup is the theory that using the possibility of injunctive
relief, a patent owner could force a party wishing to license their patented
technology to pay an exorbitant, or at least unfairly high, royalty rate. 72
Royalty stacking is the idea that, since products sold to consumers
incorporate a large number of patented inventions from a variety of firms,
a company wishing to make and sell these products will be forced to pay
an excessive aggregated amount, or “stack,” in order to license all of the
necessary technology. 73 Royalty stacking assumes that each of the many
patent holders will act non-competitively and set linear prices, charging
more for the bundle of inputs than a single patent holder because each of
the many patent holders is acting solely in their own self-interest. 74
While patent holdup and royalty stacking could happen in any
industry, they are of particular concern when the patents in questions are
SEPs. This is because SEPs are, by their nature, difficult to design
around. 75 With respect to patent holdup, implementers argue that SEP
owners can seek unfairly high royalty rates for an implementer to practice
72. See Alexander Galetovic & Stephen H. Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory,
HOOVER IP2 WORKING PAPER No. 16009 (Jan. 24, 2017), http://hooverip2.org/workingpaper/wp16009 [https://perma.cc/DX5A-XH69]; J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 714, 714 (2008).
73. See Sidak, supra note 7372, at 714.
74. Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents:
Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry, HOOVER IP2 WORKING PAPER (June
2016), at 2, http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp15012 [https://perma.cc/Z3BB-XUK6].
75. Bowman Heiden & Nicolas Pettit, Patent “Trespass” and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the
Nature and Impact of Patent Holdout, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 179, 181 (2017).
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the standard because, if the implementer does not pay the requested rate,
the SEP owner can then seek to enjoin the implementer who would then
not be able to sell their standards-compliant goods or services. 76 Of
course, patent holdup is equally possible outside of the standardized
technology context; whenever a property owner has a good that others
want, but for which there is no perfect substitute, the property owner may
seek purportedly unfairly high rates for using or obtaining that good. 77
Royalty stacking is also, allegedly, facilitated in the arena of standardized
technology because many standards-compliant products incorporate
technology from hundreds, if not thousands, of SEPs owned by many
different patent owners. 78 In theory, these SEP owners could seek unfairly
high royalty rates that are stacked upon each other and result in an
unsustainably high aggregate amount to practice a technology standard. 79
The allegations of both patent holdup and royalty stacking, made by
the implementers, assert that the balance has shifted too far in the
contributor’s favor. Even putting aside the theoretical and evidentiary
problems with these doctrines, discussed below, there is also a question
about what must be balanced to enable standardization to occur and
succeed. While implementers contend they are simply trying to restore a
level of balance between themselves and the contributors by pushing back
on licensing by innovative companies under the guise of
anticompetitiveness, there is no recognition of the other aspects of
equilibria in this system. Specifically, there must be some balance of the
costs, risks, and advantages associated with standardization. In part, this
balance is provided by the patent system. In eating away at the rights the
patent system provides to competitors, implementers are decreasing the
incentives that make possible the innovation, collaboration, and
competition of the standards ecosystem. In fact, although it may seem like
a slippery slope argument, there is actual evidence to support that when
implementers argue patent holdup and royalty stacking to alter the balance
of rights and obligations in the SDO ecosystem, innovation slows and
stops. 80

76. See Sidak, supra note 72, at 714.
77. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1711 (2010) (discussing how non-infringing
substitutes or lack thereof should factor into calculation of royalty rates for patent infringement
damages).
78. See, e.g., Schmalensee, supra note 70, at 2–3 (citing the MPEG-2 standard as exemplary,
involving 425 patents held by 28 patent owners).
79. See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 74, at 2.
80. See infra II.D.
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2. The Extent and Existence of Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking
While it is hypothetically possible that patent holdup and royalty
stacking could be particularly problematic when SEPs are involved, both
theoretical and empirical counterpoints that demonstrate these phenomena
do not actually pose the significant concerns that implementers and
commentators assert. This section will explain the disconnect between the
theory and the reality surrounding these doctrines.
First, the premise of patent holdup, and indeed its origins, are based
on incomplete grounds. The underpinning of patent holdup has been
traced generally to four primary papers authored, or co-authored, by
Professor Carl Shapiro. 81 From these papers, a veritable Gorgon’s head of
academic and mainstream works has arisen. Yet the foundational papers
miss some important points that render the entire enterprise problematic.
The foundational papers by Professor Shapiro ignore the critical point that
patents specifically give the patent owner the right to exclude.82 By
ignoring this point, a primary incentive point for patents is taken away
and, moreover, it allows Professor Shapiro to argue that a patent owner’s
efforts to avoid trespass of that right is bad behavior while failing to
consider there may be legitimate reasons for the patent owner to deny
access. 83 Finally, in Professor Shapiro’s configuration of patent holdup,
there may not have been an attempt by the implementer to transact with
the patent holder; the very existence of a patent is sufficient to claim bad
behavior on the part of the patent owner. 84 Despite being based on these
flawed premises, the doctrine of patent holdup has flourished.
Second, if patent holdup were as common as one would believe from
the pervasiveness of its assertion, there would be certain outcomes that we
would expect to see. For example, we would expect the SEP holders to
have extraordinary market power, allowing them to charge supracompetitive prices for use of the technology. In turn, we would expect the
retail prices for products using the technology to be skyrocketing (or else
the supply to be dwindling) and we would expect innovation to stagnate.
The evidence, however, does not bear this out, even in a very SEPintensive space, like wireless communications.
81. Heiden & Pettit, supra note 75, at 192. These four papers include a 2001 informal policy
paper, a 2006 formal economics working paper later published in the American Law & Economics
Review, a 2007 paper co-authored with Mark Lemley and published in the Texas Law Review, and a
2007 paper co-authored with Joseph Farrell and two economics consultants. See id.
82. Id. at 196–98.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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For example, implementers have argued that the royalty burden to
implement the 3G GSM standard ranges from 10–40% of the end product
price and for 4G LTE, the burden is about 15% of the end product price. 85
Others have estimated that the royalty stack on smartphone devices is,
absent cross-licensing, about 30% of the end product price. 86 However,
there has never been any analysis of whether these numbers are actually
unfairly high or excessive. It could be that the aggregate royalty burden
reflects the accumulation of necessary SEPs, but that no single rate is
unfair, and neither is the sum. So long as the inputs for multi-component
products are priced according to the value of the patented contribution to
the end product, no SEP holder can be faulted either for patent holdup or
royalty stacking. 87 However, to reach that assessment requires a far deeper
inquiry than simply adding up the license fees—and that assessment is
rarely done.
In the absence of doing the hard work of valuing the multiple inputs
and their contribution to the end product, at the very least there should be
an inquiry about the state of the technology. If, in fact, the royalty rates
are “unreasonably high,” there should be evidence that innovation is being
impeded or that fewer products are being manufactured due to the input
costs. However, this absence is clearly missing in the mobile
communication technology space. For example, if royalty stacking were
present, one would expect the sale of smartphones to decline or stagnate
and that the prices for smartphones would increase dramatically. Yet,
between 1994 and 2013, sales of mobile communication devices
experienced a 62-fold increase. 88 Over the same time period, the average
price of mobile devices fell between -11.4% and -24.8% per year. 89
Richard Epstein has pointed out that the “notion that implementers . . . are
85. Erik Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential Patents on LTE (4G)
Telecommunications Standards, LES NOUVELLES, Sept. 2010 at 114.
86. Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller, & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack:
Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components within Modern Smart Phones,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/TheSmartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9EG-FTYA]
(unpublished manuscript, 2014). This study has been challenged by Keith Mallinson and Anne LaynFarrar. Keith Mallinson, Smartphone Revolution: Technology Patenting and Licensing Fosters
Innovation, Market Entry, and Exceptional Growth, IEEE CONSUMER ELECS. MAG.Apr. 2015, at 60;
see also Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do
We Stand After 15 Years of History?, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (Dec. 17–18, 2014)
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%28201
4%2984&doclanguage=en [https://perma.cc/T9RS-3KCH].
87. Id.
88. See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 88, at 5. In 1994, there was one manufacturer that sold
29 million phones; by 2013, there were 43 manufacturers that sold 1,810 million phones. Id.
89. Id.
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being suffocated by an insurmountable patent royalty stack has turned out
to be nothing more than horror fiction” and supported this claim by
pointing to multiple large companies that have recently entered the mobile
communication device space. 90
Looking at the issue of patent holdup and royalty stacking from
another perspective, it would be expected that implementers would see
very low-profit margins as a result of innovators’ opportunistic behavior.
Yet, this too is not borne out by the data. Profit margins of mobile
telephone manufacturers (an area rife with standardized technology and
SEPs) typically range from twenty to forty percent. 91 Further, despite
claims that royalty stacking could cause rates to accumulate to greater
than twenty percent of a device’s price, empirical evidence demonstrates
that royalty rates are instead in the three to five percent range.92
Third, patent holdup and royalty stacking are not, as has been argued,
a natural and inevitable byproduct of standardization. Patent holdup
requires both opportunity and action by the patent holder. 93 With respect
to opportunity, having an SEP does not automatically confer on the patent
holder the ability to obtain unfairly high royalty rates. This is, in part,
because not all patents are created equally; similarly, not all standards are
equally successful. 94 Automatically assuming that an SEP designation
makes a patent valuable and confers an ability to leverage the market
ignores these two important facts. This is similar to the assumption that
patents, more generally, create market power. Yet even when there are no
substitutes, there is no guarantee that a technology will succeed in the
markets.
Beyond that, it is rarely in an SEP owner’s self-interest to seek
excessive royalty rates. Standardization is often a repeat-player game; if a
patent holder acts in an unfair manner, it is unlikely that other firms will
be willing to urge the adoption of that patent holder’s technology in future
90. Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdup” Threaten
to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, HOOVER IP2 WORKING PAPERS 1, 27 (2017),
http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp17006 [https://perma.cc/BJ3B-95WW].
91. Kirti Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World, 9 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 827, 845 (2013).
92. Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Lew Zaretzki, An Estimate of the Average
Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement, and Results,
42 Telecomm. Pol’y 263, 271 (2018), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0308596117302240?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/Q76L-EBEE].
93. Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND
Damages: Part 1, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:26 AM) [hereinafter Methodologies, Part 1].
94. Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakesj & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value
Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405,
406 (1998) (“The importance of innovations protected by individual patents varies widely.”).
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standards development proceedings. 95 Additionally, there are risks for
patent holders in engaging in unfair negotiations with implementers. For
example, implementers may also own SEPs that the patent holder may
need to cross-license or implementers may be important firms for
commercializing the patent holder’s technology. 96 Additionally, concerns
about enforcement actions by regulatory agencies, such as the FTC or
DOJ, will generally deter innovators from engaging in truly unfair
practices. For these reasons, patent holdup and royalty stacking do not
simply occur without other conditions being present.
Patent holdup and royalty stacking present several testable
hypotheses, including the presence of lower investment in innovation,
higher quality-adjusted prices, and lower innovation rates. 97 Although
these hypotheses could be tested, however, the data does not support the
theory. For example, one study found that not only were quality-adjusted
prices not higher for an important sector of standardized technology
products, but that quality-adjusted prices decreased more rapidly than
other, non-standardized goods. 98 This same study found that rates of
technological progress and innovation in standards-intensive industries
were faster than rates of innovation in most other industries. 99 This finding
was reinforced by a different study, in the mobile communications field,
that found significant and ongoing technological improvements in a space
dominated by standardized technology. 100
Much scholarly work supports these arguments and findings that
patent holdup and royalty stacking is not a significant problem, if it even
exists. 101 For example, Jonathan Barnett, in a number of articles, has
argued that the empirical evidence does not bear out the existence of

95. Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete
Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 804 (2014) (discussing the repeat-player nature of standards
development).
96. J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of Frand, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
931 (2013) (explaining the value of cross-licensing to owners of SEPs).
97. Dirk Auer & Julian Morris, Governing the Patent Commons, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 291, 311 (2020).
98. Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent
Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 551 (2015), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/AnEmpirical-Examination-of-Patent-Hold-Up-GaletovicHaber/5faa11d344887c9df68d4e2cc468049c9f17e100 [https://perma.cc/9PXS-Z85P].
99. Id. at 565.
100. Keith Mallinson, Don’t Fix What Isn’t Broken: The Extraordinary Record of Innovation &
Success in the Cellular Industry Under Existing Licensing Practices, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967,
969 (2016).
101. Galetovic & Haber, supra note 72.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/4

22

Osenga: Following the DOJ's Lead

2020]

FOLLOWING THE DOJ’S LEAD

627

patent holdup and royalty stacking. 102 Specifically, Barnett argues that
prices for smartphones, a heavily SEP-dependent product, have fallen;
that implementers in the same industry are not burdened by double-digit
royalty rates; and that there is exceptional growth, adoption, and entry in
the market, none of which would be expected in the presence of patent
holdup and royalty stacking. 103 Alexander Galetovic and Stephen Haber
have also authored numerous pieces that call the existence and extent of
patent holdup and royalty stacking into question. They have identified a
series of nested claims which have given rise to patent holdup theory, and
then have debunked each of the claims 104 and have empirically studied the
phenomenon of patent holdup in SEP-reliant industries. 105 Similarly,
Daniel Spulber has argued that patent holdup is a fallacy and explains the
lack of evidence for its existence. 106 In a literature review, Gregory Sidak
identified via a study of twenty-one articles that “more than two dozen
economists and lawyers have disproved or disputed patent holdup and
royalty stacking.” 107 These, and other academic studies, align with the
evidence, or lack thereof, of patent holdup and royalty stacking being of
significant concern in the standards arena.

102. Jonathan M. Barnett, Antitrust Overreach: Undoing Cooperative Standardization in the
Digital Economy, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 163 (2019); Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led
Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1313 (2017).
103. Id.
104. Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory, 13 J. COMP.
LAW & ECON. 1 (2017).
105. Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J.
COMP. LAW & ECON. 549 (2015).
106. Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents with FRAND Commitments:
Preparing for 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18 COLO. TECH. L.J. 79, 132–135 (2020).
107. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential
Patents, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48, 61 n.49 (2015) (listing 21 articles which demonstrate that “more
than two dozen economists and lawyers had disproved or disputed the numerous assumptions and
predictions of the patent-holdup and royalty-stacking conjectures.”); see also Bronwyn H. Hall &
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, An Empirical Analysis of Patent Litigation in the Semiconductor Industry,
15, 17 (Am. Econ. Ass’n Ann. Meeting, Working Paper, 2007) (in an analysis not limited to SEPs,
finding that patent enforcement rates have remained stable since the 1970s despite general
strengthening of IPRs, and noting that firms exiting an industry may account for a significant degree
of patent litigation).
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HOW THE FTC AND THE DOJ HAVE IMPACTED THE
BALANCE

There is certainly a role for regulation, but regulation should always
take into account the impact that it has on the markets, a balance that
must be constantly weighed. – Jerome Powell 108
Despite there being legitimate questions about the existence and
extent of patent holdup and royalty stacking, implementers and others
have pled for changes that devalue SEPs in the name of warding off these
ills. Specifically, arguments have been made that injunctive relief should
not be available for infringement of SEPs and that government agencies
or SDOs should have the ability to interfere with licensing agreements
between private parties as related to SEPs. 109 While many of these
proposals have been aimed at courts, there have also been assertions of
patent holdup and royalty stacking made to the two agencies charged with
enforcing and promoting competition in the United States—the FTC and
the DOJ. The reactions of these agencies are the focus of this Article.
The FTC and the DOJ have long been interested in the space at the
intersection of innovation and competition. While much of these agencies’
earlier animus with respect to innovation, and to patents generally, has
fallen away, the specter of anticompetitive concern about SDOs and the
behavior of contributors have been prevalent for the last decade or so.
Specifically, the competition authorities have used these notions of patent
holdup and royalty stacking to justify intervening in various ways to favor
implementers over contributors in the standards development space. In
some cases, the agencies have affected a contributor’s rights directly, such
as by bringing a lawsuit against a company alleging anticompetitive
behavior grounded in patent holdup. In other cases, the agencies have
influenced the rights of contributors indirectly, by making statements in
public fora or by approving, at least implicitly (and sometimes explicitly),
policies that adversely affect contributors. This section will first discuss
the historical stances of both agencies with respect to their view of
intellectual property, as well as how the historical stances began to shift
108. Jerome Powell, Governor, Treasury Markets and the TMPG, Speech before the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/powell20171005a.htm [https://perma.cc/5QJU-GP5Y].
109. See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 1159 (2017); Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and
Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451 (2015); Daryl Lim, Standard Essential
Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1
(2014); Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. L. REV. 1 (2014).
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in the 1980s. Next, this section will describe direct actions, many taken
by the FTC, that favor implementers over contributors. Next, this section
will examine indirect actions, mostly by the DOJ, that have harmed
contributors. Finally, this section will consider how the myriad actions,
both direct and indirect, have had lasting negative, chilling effects on
innovation, collaboration, and competition these agencies are supposed to
protect.
A. Historical Views Affecting the SDO Space
The DOJ Antitrust division was established in 1933 and has the
power to enforce antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act. 110 The FTC was established in 1914 and is charged with policing
“unfair methods of competition,” including, but not limited, to antitrust.111
With respect to intellectual property and antitrust issues, the two agencies
have often cooperated. For example, over the years, the DOJ and FTC
have produced joint guidelines describing the relationship between IP and
antitrust, as well as guidelines for licensing IP within the antitrust
system. 112 Other forays by the agencies, particularly with regard to SEPs,
have been individual agency efforts.
Since the beginning, the relationship between competition, as set
forth in antitrust law and policy, and innovation, manifest in the patent
system, has been somewhat fraught. 113 Although the long and storied
history of patents and antitrust is interesting, it is largely outside the scope
of this Article. Whatever tension there is, however, is somewhat relieved
in understanding the integrated nature of innovation, collaboration, and
competition, as described above. That said, however, it is helpful to take
a quick look at previous era when the competition authorities, and
specifically the DOJ, preferenced competition over innovation, holding a
number of activities related to patent ownership to be anticompetitive.
In 1970, at the “high point of patent aggressiveness,” the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ set forth a list of “nine no-nos,” or a list of activities

110. See generally, Gregory J. Werden, Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 419 (2018).
111. Steven S. Nam, Our Country, Right or Wrong: The FTC Act’s Influence on National Silos
in Antitrust Enforcement, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 210, 218 (2018).
112. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (1995) [https://perma.cc/KRD8-S58M] [hereinafter 1995 Guidelines]; U.S.
Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/WZ7K-DEKU].
113. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust & the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
467, 468 (2015).
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related to patents that were certain to raise antitrust issues. 114 The “nine
no-nos” included:
1. Tying the purchase of unpatented materials as a condition of
a license;
2. Requiring the licensee to assign back subsequent patents;
3. Restricting the resale right of a product’s purchases;
4. Restricting a licensee’s ability to deal in products outside the
scope of the patent;
5. Prohibiting a licensor from granting further licenses;
6. Requiring mandatory package licensing;
7. Requiring, as a condition of the license, royalties not
reasonably related to the licensee’s sale of products covered
by the patent;
8. Restricting a licensee’s use of a product made by a patented
process; and
9. Setting minimum resale price provisions for licensed
products. 115
After a few cases where the DOJ pursued patentees for allegedly
anticompetitive behavior under this rigid framework that specifically
preferenced competition over innovation, the agency took a step back and
adopted policies that instead were pro-patent. This was based in part on
the recognition that patents play a positive role in encouraging innovation,
which is itself pro-competitive. In 1981, the DOJ announced, via a speech
by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Lipsky, that the “nine no-nos”
were no longer policy. 116 Today, none of these activities are illegal per
se. 117
Through the rest of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the DOJ and FTC
generally approved of patent licensing, manifest in the 1995 issuance of
the joint DOJ-FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property Guidelines. 118 Important considerations of the 1995 Guidelines
114. Id. at 469.
115. Id. at 470 (citing Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of
Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS, FRANCHISING,
TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11, 11–21 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed. 1970)).
116. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50
ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 515 (1981).
117. See Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 471.
118. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 112. See also Alden Abbott, US Government Antitrust
Intervention in Standard-Setting Activities and the Competitive Process, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 225, 230 (2016).
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include 1) for the purposes of antitrust law, intellectual property should
be regarded as comparable to other property; 2) there is no presumption
that intellectual property creates market power; and 3) IP licensing,
because it allows firms to combine complementary factors of production,
is generally pro-competitive. 119 In 2007, the agencies again joined forces
to issue a report on antitrust enforcement and intellectual property rights
that generally tracked the concepts of the 1995 Guidelines. 120 And then,
everything changed.
B. Direct Actions Favoring Implementers
In modern times, the FTC has taken a leading role in bringing direct
enforcement actions against innovative companies that participate in
SDOs and subsequently, at least according to the FTC, behave in an
anticompetitive manner. The FTC has brought several significant
enforcement actions against contributors over the past two decades.121 For
example, the FTC has brought actions against Dell, Rambus, Unocal, and
NData, among others, for allegedly anticompetitive activities involving
SEPs. 122 To be fair, however, at times FTC has brought unfair competition
actions against SDO contributors for failure to disclose SEP holdings. 123
These cases, for failure to adhere to an IPR disclosure policy, are different
because the disclosure policy is specifically intended to balance the
playing field between contributor and implementer; claims of patent
holdup, on the other hand, are based on specious, non-evidence-based
assertions of bad behavior. On the other hand, the agency has also brought
actions based on licensing activity by contributors, either explicitly or
implicitly based in patent holdup and royalty stacking. In contrast, the
DOJ has never brought an action on holdup grounds. 124
Looking closely at some of these FTC cases, it is clear that some are
based on patent holdup, even where it was not specifically alleged. For
example, in the Bosch case, the FTC asserted that a SEP holder’s pursuit

119. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 112 at 2.
120. See Abbott, supra note 116, at 230–31.
121. Federal Trade Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, Holding the Line
on Patent Holdup: Why Antitrust Enforcement Matters (Mar. 21, 2018), n. 21 (referencing
enforcement actions against Dell, Rambus, Inc., Union Oil of California, Negotiated Data Solutions,
LLC, Bosch, Motorola Mobility and Qualcomm).
122. Bruce H. Kobayashi, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An
Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469 (2009).
123. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Dell Computer
Corporation, 121 FTC 616 (1996).
124. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner Terrell McSweeny supra note 121.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 4

632

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:605

of injunctive relief was an unfair method of competition. 125 In the
Motorola case, the FTC claimed that Motorola “breached its FRAND
obligations by seeking to enjoin and exclude implementers of its SEPs”
and that “Motorola filed, and [parent company] Google prosecuted, patent
infringement claims before the United States International Trade
Commission.” 126 These cases led some commentators to observe the
FTC’s actions “logically and necessarily depend on the presumption that
protecting a valid SEP against infringement by obtaining injunctive relief
is itself anticompetitive.” 127 Denial of injunctive relief, and going so far
as to assert that SEP owners are never entitled to injunctive relief, is an
explicit response to alleged patent holdup.
In other cases, the FTC has been more explicit about patent holdup
driving its position. For example, in 2012, in a statement of public interest
submitted in “Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music
and Data Processing Devices, Computers, and Components Thereof”, the
FTC claimed that the issuance of an exclusion order might facilitate patent
holdup. 128 In making this argument, the FTC asserted that even the mere
threat of patent holdup could harm consumers by deterring innovation and
reducing the value of standardized technology. 129 Of course, the mere
threat of patent holdup was all that existed in this case; evidence of actual
patent holdup did not exist.
Most recently, in 2017, the FTC filed a lawsuit against Qualcomm,
an innovator active in the wireless technology space and a significant
contributor to the 3G, 4G, and 5G SDOs, asserting their licensing program
for their patents was anticompetitive. 130 In 2019, Judge Lucy Koh agreed
with the FTC, concluding that Qualcomm’s unfair licensing practices had
enabled the company to charge “unreasonably high royalty rates” for its
CDMA and LTE chips. 131 This claim of “high royalty rates” also sounds
in patent holdup and royalty stacking. This case is further discussed
below, as evidence of the FTC’s continued pursuit of cases based on
patent holdup and royalty stacking.
125. Complaint, In re Robert Bosch GmbH, ⁋ 20, Dkt. No. C-4377, 2012 WL 5944820 (Nov.
21, 2012).
126. Complaint, In re Motorola Mobility LLC, ⁋⁋ 26–26, Dkt. No. C-4410, 2013 WL 3944149
(July 23, 2013).
127. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis of
Intellectual Property Rights at the FTC and DOJ, 9 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 41 (2013).
128. Third Party U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n Statement on Public Interest, Inv. No. 337-TA-745,
Dkt. No. 482234 (May 9, 2012).
129. Id. at 3.
130. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp.3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/case-document/file/1236026/download [https://perma.cc/6RX7-XZUL].
131. Id. at 698–812.
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C. Indirect Actions Favoring Implementers
Although better known for its direct actions in favor of
implementers, as described above, the FTC has also influenced the SDO
ecosystem in other less-direct ways, such as through its 2011 report
entitled “The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and
Remedies with Competition.” 132 The proposal in this report, while not
conferring any direct power on the FTC to set license terms, would have
allowed the FTC to bring actions against innovators for allegedly
anticompetitive pricing. Additionally, in discussing injunctive relief in the
standards arena, the report notes that “Hold-up in the standard setting
context can be particularly acute” and that the “infringer may face
significant hardship” if an injunction is granted. 133 Moreover, in
conjunction with the DOJ, the FTC has also influenced policy with respect
to patent holdup. For example, in the 2007 joint guidelines on antitrust
and IP, the DOJ and the FTC noted that patent holdup could cause
competitive harm. 134
On its own, however, the DOJ has had significant impact on
intellectual property policy and SDOs through its published and printed
remarks. One DOJ representative public stated that patent holdup was “at
the forefront of many of the Antitrust Division’s intellectual property (IP)
related enforcement and advocacy efforts.” 135 The ultimate turn came in
2012, when a head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ urged SDOs to
alter their intellectual property rights policies “to seize the opportunity to
eliminate some of the ambiguity that requires difficult ex post deciphering
of the scope of a F/RAND commitment.” 136 These remarks, and others
made around the same time, set into motion what would end up as the
2015 IEEE Amendments to the SDO’s IPR policies. Additionally, the
DOJ through its business review letter process has had the opportunity to

132. Suzanne Michel, William Cohen, William Adkinson, Erika Meyers, Suzanne Drennon
Munck, Joel Schrag, Karen Goldman, Christopher Bryan & Christopher Falcone, The Evolving IP
Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N
(2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/U88C-VSWQ].
133. Id. at 234.
134. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, 42 (2007).
135. See Fiona M. Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Econ. Analysis, Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Role of Standards in the Current Patent Wars, presented at the Charles
River Associates Annual Brussels Conference: Economic Developments in European Competition
Policy (Dec. 5, 2012).
136. Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six
“Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch (October 12, 2012).
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consider various policies and procedures that SDOs have implemented. 137
This section will first describe in detail the policy campaign waged by the
DOJ, before turning to the how the statement of the DOJ official was
manifest in the 2015 IEEE Amendments, followed by the Business
Review Letter issued by the DOJ that essentially approved the
amendments and went even further.
1. The DOJ Against “Patent Holdup”
In October 2012, during a Patent Roundtable convened by ITU-T in
Geneva Switzerland, then DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata
Hesse gave a lunchtime presentation calling for change in FRAND
policies of SDOs, entitled “Six ‘Small’ Proposals for SSOs Before
Lunch.” 138 Among other things, Hesse argued that innovators bound by a
FRAND commitment should be limited in their ability to seek injunction
and that SDOs should explore guidelines for what constitutes FRAND
rates. 139 In her remarks, she highlights concerns about patent holdup as a
risk to innovation and competition. 140 To avoid patent holdup, she notes
“Standards bodies whose members choose to take [the above-mentioned
steps] will help the market for the standardized product to work efficiently
by lowering costs, increasing transparency, and reducing uncertainty, all
of which benefit innovation and competition.” 141 Among Ms. Hesse’s “six
small proposals” was a suggestion that the ability to seek injunctive relief
should be limited if the patent holder had made a FRAND commitment
and a proposal to lower the transaction costs of FRAND by setting
guidelines for what would be a FRAND rate, among others. 142
While this speech by Ms. Hesse is usually credited for pushing the
IEEE to action, there were multiple times when DOJ officials made
similar statements. For example, in May 2012, Ms. Scott-Morton
delivered a presentation entitled “Antitrust Issues regarding Standard
Essential Patents” at a semi-annual meeting of the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) Intellectual Property Rights Policy Committee
(IPRPC). During her remarks, she stated that injunctive relief should not
be available for SEP owners: By participating in SSO and agreeing to
137. Jorge Contreras, Taking It to the Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy Towards Standards
Development, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 66, 69 tbl.1 (2018) (listing nine DOJ StandardsRelated Business Review Letters).
138. See Hesse, supra note 136.
139. Id. at 9–10.
140. Id. at 4–5.
141. Id. at 10.
142. Id. at 9–10.
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FRAND, the patent owner restricts its ability to price and exclude.”
Additionally, she noted that the DOJ was urging SDOs to make changes
to their IPR policies, stating that “the Division will continue to . . .
encourage improvements by SSOs” and “SSOs have been slow to change
rules in response to conflict and litigation.” 143 Ms. Hesse, in addressing
the same body in November 2012 reiterated that SDOs should change
their IPR policies. 144
In December 2012, Ms. Scott-Morton delivered a speech entitled
“The Role of Standards in the Current Patent Wars,” in which she said,
“One of the actions [the DOJ has] taken is to advocate for changes at the
SSO level to address the inability of the current FRAND commitment to
protect licensees from holdup,” specifically by limiting the availability of
injunctive relief for SEP owners. 145 That same month, Ms. Scott-Morton
gave a speech entitled “Antitrust Enforcement in High-Technology
Industries: Protecting Innovation and Competition” at the 2012 NYSBA
Annual Antitrust Forum, where she concluded by noting that the DOJ is
“actively engaged with both firms and [SDOs] to encourage behavior that
benefits competition.” 146
In November 2013, Ms. Hesse gave a speech entitled “The Art of
Persuasion: Competition Advocacy at the Intersection of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property,” where she praised court decisions that preferenced
implementers over innovators and explained that part of the DOJ’s
advocacy was aimed at encouraging SDOs to make IPR policies more
procompetitive, without any explanation about what was anticompetitive
in the existing policies. 147
At no time during any of the DOJ speeches were the statements about
patent holdup or decreased competition and innovation supported by any
evidence; rather, the agency promoted this policy based on a blanket
assumption that contributors, and their SEP rights, were bad for
competition.

143. Although this speech by Ms. Scott-Morton does not seem to be available on the Department
of Justice website, Ms. Hesse references Ms. Scott-Morton’s speech during her own November 2012
speech to ANSI IPRPC. See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, The Antitrust Division and SSOs: Continuing the Dialogue (Nov. 8, 2012).
144. Id.
145. See Scott-Morton, supra note 135.
146. Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Enforcement in High-Technology Industries: Protecting Innovation and Competition, 19 (Dec. 7,
2012).
147. See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The
Art of Persuasion: Competition Advocacy at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property
(Nov. 8, 2013) https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518356/download [https://perma.cc/4W7Q-8F5Y].
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2. The 2015 IEEE Amendments
The IEEE took the remarks from the two DOJ officials described
above to heart. In a late added agenda item to the March 2013 IEEE-SA
Standards Board Patent Committee (PatCom) meeting, Phil Wennblom
from Intel suggested the committee take up “Challenges Set by the
DoJ.” 148 The minutes from that meeting reflect that “Phil Wennblom
noted that the DoJ had set out ‘Six ‘small’ proposals for SSOs Before
Lunch’ during the ITU-T Patent Roundtable in October 2012 as a
challenge to SDOs to consider actions they could take to help promote
competition among implementers of a standard.” 149 An ad hoc committee
was then formed to “discuss the DOJ challenges and provide
recommendations to PatCom” at its next meeting. 150 According to the
minutes of the June PatCom meeting, “meeting attendees were given an
opportunity to offer comments on each of the six US DOJ suggestions
[from Ms. Hesse’s speech]. There was much good discussion.” 151
In February 2015, IEEE announced that its board of directors had
approved amendments to its IPR policies stating: “The policy must
balance several concerns, including respect for the rights of patent-holders
and assurance that licenses to standards-essential patents are available on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms to all implementers.” 152 While
the sentiment sounds balanced, the substance of the 2015 IEEE
Amendments was very much implementer-focused. In fact, as one
commentator noted at the time, the changes “are expressly aimed at
driving down compensation” innovators will receive for licensing patents
to implementers. 153
Although the scope of the amendments is broad, there are two
primary areas altered by the amendments: first, how to define a
“reasonable rate” as part of a FRAND commitment, and second,
prohibiting a contributor who has made a FRAND commitment from

148. See IEEE-SA Standards Board Patent Committee, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, https:
//standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/governance/patcom/0313mins.pdf
[https://perma.cc/287X-KB5B].
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id.
151. IEEE-SA PatCom Minutes, 3 (June 12, 2013) https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieeestandards/standards/web/governance/patcom/0613mins.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F8P-9Z7Q].
152. Press Release, IEEE, IEEE Statement Regarding Updating of its Standards-Related Patent
Policy (Feb. 8, 2015) [https://perma.cc/TV9H-V6RK].
153. Ray E. Hoffinger, The 2015 DOJ IEEE Business Review Letter: The Triumph of Industrial
Policy Preferences Over Law and Evidence, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Mar. 2015, at 2.
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seeking injunctive relief against an infringing implementer. 154 Both of
these areas of change shift the balance very squarely to favor the
implementers, especially the prohibition on injunctive relief. Patent
holders have a right to seek injunctive relief and the Supreme Court has
held that there are no categorical exceptions to this right.155 By removing
the threat of injunction, implementers are discouraged from negotiating in
good faith and accepting a license; after all, the worst that could happen
is that they would be required to pay court-ordered royalty damages that,
in many cases, are less than a negotiated-for license. Thus, the 2015 IEEE
Amendments perversely encourage implementers to not take licenses and
instead infringe. 156
3. The DOJ’s BRL Letter in Response
In addition to its public comments about patent holdup and royalty
stacking, the DOJ has more concretely affected policies regarding SDOs
and SEPs through its issuance of non-binding business review letters, or
BRL. BRL are intended to set forth the Antitrust Division’s current
enforcement intentions, 157 in these cases with respect to changes to IPR
policies as proposed by SDOs. Many SDOs have sought, and received,
business review letters. 158
Oddly, in the case of the IEEE, the DOJ did not just acknowledge as
non-problematic the 2015 IEEE Amendments, but instead applauded the
changes. While the policy was being developed, commentators noted that
the revised IEEE policy could invoke antitrust concerns. For example,
Gregory Sidak opined that the proposed changes could facilitate collusion
amongst implementers and result in a suppression of royalty rates paid for
use of SEPs. 159 Similarly, a representative from Ericsson stated that the
proposed amendments to the policy “constitute[d] the collective
establishment of mandatory, uniform license terms … akin to a buyer’s
154. Draft IEEE Standard Board Bylaws, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2014)
https://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/SBBylaws_100614_redline_current.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RJJ-MYF6].
155. eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (denying categorical exceptions
to a party’s ability to seek and obtain injunctive relief for patent infringement).
156. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, The IEEE’s New IPR Policy: Did the IEEE Shoot Itself
in the Foot and Harm Innovation? 6 (Tusher Center for the Management of Intellectual Capital,
Working
Paper
Series
No.
13,
2016)
https://businessinnovation.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Tusher-Center-Working-Paper-No.-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5P2-3TKP].
157. See Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. 50.6 (2020).
158. See Contreras, supra note 137, at tbl.1.
159. Letter from J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, L.L.C., to Hon. Renata
Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2015).
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side cartel.” 160 Because of these and other concerns, the IEEE requested a
Business Review Letter (BRL) to address “vague of specific antitrust
concerns” including that adding definitions to the term “‘reasonable rate’
. . . could amount to ‘buyer-side price fixing.’” 161
On February 2, 2015, the DOJ responded with a BRL stating it did
not intend to take enforcement action against the IEEE with respect to the
proposed amendments to the IEEE IPR policy. 162 The letter, written by
Ms. Hesse, is perhaps unsurprising in its approval of the amendments,
given that IEEE was inspired to amend their IPR policy based on Ms.
Hesse’s 2012 remarks. What is surprising is that the letter “says little or
nothing about the policies reflected in patent law” and ignores “decades
of settled antitrust law.” 163 To be fair, some consider the DOJ’s decision
“not to interfere with the inner workings of” a particular SDO to be the
best policy, approving of the BRL from a policy standpoint at least. 164
The 2015 BRL represented a departure from previous FTC and DOJ
policy, where the agencies stated that they do “not advocate that SDOs
adopt any specific disclosure or licensing policy, and the Agencies do not
suggest that any specific disclosure or licensing policy is required.”165
This flexible policy was desirable because, as SDOs are unique in size,
organization, and scope, the SDOs might “need to cater to different needs
of their members.” 166 The BRL also skips over concerns the DOJ has
previously raised when an SDO forayed into this mode of selecting
implementers over innovators. For example, in 2007, Hill Wellford,
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, stated
“SDO buyer-cartel behavior has the real potential to damage innovation
incentives, and therefore is properly the subject of antitrust scrutiny.” 167
160. IEEE-SA Standards Board Patent Committee, IEEE-SA Patent Policy, Draft Comments ID
No. 38, 16 (comments of Dina Kallay, Director for IP and Competition, Ericsson),
https://grouper.ieee.org/groups/ppdialog/drafts_comments/PatCom_sort_by_commentID_040314.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL66-GYQ2].
161. Letter from Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Hon. William J. Baer,
Assistant
Att’y
Gen.,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice
18–19
(Sept.
30,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/17/311483.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JCD-6N6G].
162. Business Review Letter from Hon. Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dept. of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsey, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P. (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.htm [https://perma.cc/THU5-Q35Y].
163. See Hoffinger, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2.
164. See Auer & Morris, supra note 97, at 340–41.
165. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 134, at 48.
166. Id. at 33 n.5.
167. Hill B. Wellford, Counsel, to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Issues in Standard Setting
15 (Mar. 29, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222236.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VBA44CG].
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Similarly, on at least three prior occasions, the DOJ has declined to
provide a blanket endorsement of policies that allowed implementers to
jointly set or negotiate fees. 168 Despite this history, the 2015 BRL issued
to IEEE says nothing about these risks, nothing about the likelihood that
coordinated efforts by implementers would depress licenses paid for use
of SEPs, and, sadly, did not include any consideration of competitive
issues for innovators at all. 169
The only pro-competitive justifications offered in the BRL are
questionable. First, the DOJ cites mitigation of patent holdup as a
justification for not enforcing antitrust laws, but as noted above, patent
holdup is a theoretical concern that has not been proven to exist generally,
let alone regarding IEEE standards. 170 Second, the DOJ justifies the BRL
on the basis of addressing the “broad problem of uncertainty” with respect
to FRAND. This uncertainty is lacking in evidence and, even if it were a
demonstrable problem, the 2015 IEEE Amendments do little to cure it. 171
Finally, the DOJ focused on patent holdup without considering reverse
holdup (or holdout) by implementers, who seek to use standardized
technology without paying fair consideration for it and without
acknowledging that the 2015 IEEE Amendments would drastically reduce
royalties being paid by implementers to innovators without any evidence
that patent holders had been previously systematically overpaid. 172
The BRL also “went well beyond [the DOJ’s] mission” by endorsing
a policy choice, rather than simply announcing enforcement intent. 173
Another commentator noted the BRL is “an expression of the industrial
policy preference of [the 2015] DOJ for potential short-term price
reductions at the expense of providing long-term incentives to engage in
R&D for technologies useful in standards,” or basically preferencing
implementer over innovator. 174 This perspective was reinforced, after the
BRL, by statements by the DOJ’s Renata Hesse: “Our [Business Review]
letter helped the IEEE clarify the scope of licensing commitments made
by participants in its standard setting process, which in turn will facilitate
licensing negotiations and mitigate the risk of hold-up giving
168. See Hoffinger, supra note 153, at 5.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 17–19.
171. Id. at 20.
172. The IEEE’s New IPR Policy, supra note 154, at 2; J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust
Division’s Devaluation of Standard Essential Patents, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48, 49 (2015),
https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/antitrust-divisions-devaluation-of-standard-essentialpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3TD-3CGG].
173. See Wong-Ervin & Wright, supra note 3, at 52–53.
174. See Hoffinger, supra note 153.
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implementers greater confidence in using the IEEE’s standards for
developing new products.” 175
D. After-Effects and Impact on SDO Space
The direct and indirect actions of the FTC and the DOJ have had a
negative impact on innovation, collaboration, and competition in the SDO
space. Although these actions were premised on the ideas of correcting a
perceived imbalance between contributors and implementers created by
patent holdup and royalty stacking, the fact that patent holdup and royalty
stacking are not actually present in the SDO ecosystem means that the
corrections imposed by the FTC and the DOJ have instead tipped the
balance in favor of implementers in ways that have harmed contributors
and SDO participation more broadly. As commentators have expressed,
specifically in reference to the 2015 IEEE Amendments, the “delicate
balance of interests in favor of implementers of standards and against the
interests of patent holders who have contributed their technology for use
in standards” has been irrevocably upset.176 This section explains the
fallout to innovation that has followed the various agency actions.
1. Reaction Within SDOs
The actions of the DOJ and the FTC have had clear effects on SDOs.
Some of the effects include contributors deciding to curtail or even cease
their participation in SDOs. Other effects include slowed innovation
within the SDOs due to these issues. Moreover, these effects have had a
cascading impact on SDOs in terms of legitimacy of the standards.
Perhaps the clearest example of contributor reaction to agency action
is seen within the IEEE itself. A number of industry participants,
including some of the most prodigious contributors, have stated they will
not comply with all, or at least certain aspects, of the new IPR policies.177
For example, Nokia wrote in a letter to IEEE in November 2014 that, if
the amendments were passed, “Nokia will not make its patents available
for licensing.” 178 Ericsson expressed a larger concern: “Given that

175. Renata B. Hesse, Antitrust: Helping Drive the Innovation Economy (Feb. 5, 2016), U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-generalrenata-b-hesse-delivers-remarks-global [https://perma.cc/Q647-F4SS] (emphasis added).
176. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 156, at 5.
177. Id. at 12.
178. Ron D. Katznelson, Presentation, Will New IEEE Standards Incorporate Patented
Technologies Under the Proposed Patent Policy? (Dec. 2014), at 12, https://slidelegend.com/willnew-ieee-standards-incorporate-patented-technologies-under-the-
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Ericsson will not be able to provide [Letters of Assurance] under the new
policy, design around Ericsson’s technology would be necessary, but may
not be practically feasible and is likely to result in significant loss in
system performance or reliability. Depriving further IEEE standards of
such superior solutions may cause future Wi Fi standard releases to fail to
meet market requirements.” 179 Qualcomm and Interdigital also announced
early that they did not intend to comply. 180 Huawei, previously a
significant contributor to the Wi Fi standard, went over four years without
submitting any patent assurance forms, reducing the clarity of patent
coverage surrounding IEEE-SA standards. 181
As far as changing working conditions within the SDO itself,
engineers working on IEEEs Wi Fi standard have described the effects of
the 2015 IEEE Amendments as “delay and chaos,” causing “a loss of
momentum” and resulting in a “broken process.” 182 Scholars studying the
impact of the amendments are finding similar negative effects. For
example, Ron Katznelson has looked at how submissions of letters of
assurance are being affected, finding that there is a 90% decline in letters
of assurance and the standardization process is being delayed due to
this. 183 Kirti Gupta and Georgios Effraimidis have studied how the policy

_59ec11691723dd57baa94267.html [https://perma.cc/6JFM-P44L] (quoting Nokia letter to IEEE of
November 18, 2014).
179. Id.
180. Teece & Sherry, supra note 156, at 11; see also, Letter from Lawrence F. Shay, Exec. Vice
President of Intellectual Prop., Interditigal, Inc., to David Law, Patent Comm. Chair, IEEE-SA
Standards Board (Mar. 24, 2015), http://wpuploads.interdigital.com.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/
2015/03/Letter-to-IEEE-SA-PatCom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GHQ-TCLX]; Letter from Gustav
Brismark, Vice President, Strategy & Portfolio Mgmt., Ericsson AAB, to Eileen M. Lach, Gen.
Counsel & Chief Compliance Officer, IEEE (Oct. 21, 2014), cited in Wong-Ervin & Wright, supra
note 3, at 53 n.8.
181. Richard Lloyd, Huawei joins IEEE patent refuseniks four years since controversial policy
change, INTELL. ASSET MGMNT. (May 17, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/huaweijoins-ieee-patent-refuseniks-four-years-controversial-policy-change
[https://perma.cc/46DUMWV6].
182. See MINUTES (UNCONFIRMED) IEEE802 LMSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING (Jan.
22,
2016),
http://www.ieee802.org/minutes/2016_01/2016-01-22-minutes-v1.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/9VGL-FXNJ].
183. See Ronald Katznelson, Symposium on Antitrust, Standard Essential Patens, and the
Fallacy of the Anticommons Tragedy, Berkeley, CA, The 2015 IEEE Policy on Standard
EssentialPatents – The Empirical Record (2016) http://bit.ly/IEEE-LOAs [https://perma.cc/R6JCUE6Z]. This work has been questioned by IPlytics, which claims more letters of assurance were
submitted and new standardization work has commenced since implementation of the 2015 IEEE
Amendments). See Empirical Studies on patenting and standardization activities at IEEE, IPLYTICS
GMBH,
https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/IPlytics_2017_Patenting-andstandardization-activities-at-IEEE.pdf [https://perma.cc/V64G-TZ7T] (2016).
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changes have impacted other aspects of standards development. 184
Focusing on patent-intensive standards, IEEE 802 LM SC, Gupta and
Effraimidis found that positive letters of assurance (where the patent
owner agrees to license its SEPs under the required terms) had dropped
by 91% and negative letters of assurance, where the patent owner
specifically declines to give assurances regarding licensing, were
increasingly submitted, with more negative letters being submitted than
positive letters during their study period. 185 They also determined that the
working groups in this area were taking longer to complete the
standardization process. 186
It is more difficult to pinpoint, precisely, how the FTC’s direct
actions against individual SDO contributors has negative impacted SDOs
more generally: other than the obvious perspective that these targeted
contributors are likely to be cautious about reengaging in the same
behavior. However, Professors Epstein, Kieff, and Spulber have assessed
the negative effects that would be caused if the FTC were to act on the
proposals in its report entitled “The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning
Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition.” 187 Given that the
background of this report is to address patent holdup, including in the
SDO setting, the professors’ assessment provides a valuable perspective
on how the FTC’s actions in the SDO space will have a negative impact.
In particular, the professors explain how SDOs have long balanced the
interests of both contributors and implementers, and that the interventions
proposed by the FTC would interfere with this balance. 188 More
troublesome is the professors’ conclusion that the FTC’s proposal would
create SDOs that do not work for any party. 189
Finally, it is important to note that the negative impacts within an
SDO can have cascading effects beyond just slowing work and causing
contributors to opt out of participation. For example, given the concerns
about letters of assurance at the IEEE, the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) has declined to approve two recent Wi Fi standards from

184. Kirti Gupta & Georgios Effraimidis, IEEE Patent Policy Revisions: An Empirical
Examination of Impact (March 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3173799
[https://perma.cc/BB3Z-R3KV].
185. Id. at 6–8.
186. Id. at 8.
187. Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff, & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs:
Government Hold-up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1 (2012).
188. Id. at 8.
189. Id. at 13–15.
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the IEEE. 190 ANSI is a private, non-profit organization that coordinates
US voluntary standardization efforts and provides “a framework for fair
standards development and quality conformity assessment systems and
continually works to safeguard their integrity.” 191 ANSI’s refusal to
approve signifies that the quality and reputation of the Wi Fi standards
have been harmed by the 2015 IEEE Amendments.192
2. Far Reaching Effects
The effects of the FTC and DOJ actions based on patent holdup have
extended beyond responses by the SDOs, contributors, and implementers.
Courts in this country have relied on the 2015 IEEE Amendments,
applauded by the DOJ, in crafting their opinions. For example, the judge
deciding HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson pointed to the
IEEE bylaws (where the IPR policies are included) to define a “reasonable
rate.” 193 Implementers have also regularly used the 2015 IEEE
Amendments, the policy statements of the DOJ, and the FTC lawsuits in
arguing their positions before the courts. For example, at a panel
discussion held in 2020, a number of implementers reiterated the notion
that a contributor’s ownership of an SEP bound the innovator to a “duty
to deal” with any and all comers, parroting the FTC’s position in its
lawsuit against Qualcomm, and in effect turning the FRAND commitment
into a compulsory license. 194
Foreign competition enforcement agencies and courts have also
relied on these direct and indirect actions of the FTC and DOJ to make
changes to or guide their own analysis of anticompetitive behavior. For
example, the FTC reached consent agreements with both Bosch and
Motorola Mobility/Google that tipped the balance in favor of
implementers. 195 The Bosch agreement prohibits the company from
190. Leah Nylen, Electrical Engineer Institutes New Wifi Measures Won’t Get American
National Standard Designation, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Mar. 11, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/cross-jurisdiction/electricalengineer-institutes-new-wifi-measures-wont-get-american-national-standard-designation
[https://perma.cc/WQ8K-KCXX].
191. ANSI,
About
ANSI
Overview,
https://www.ansi.org/about/introduction
[https://perma.cc/UG9U-RXF9].
192. See Nylen, supra note 190.
193. HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212292 (E.D. Tex.
2018).
194. James Edwards, Do Innovators Give Up Their IP Rights? Implementer Panel Says Yes,
CONSERVATIVES FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (Jan. 31, 2020), www.property-rts.org/post/do-innovatorsgive-up-their-ip-rights-antipatent-panel-says-yes [https://perma.cc/TV3U-QKL8].
195. Wong-Ervin & Wright, supra note 3, at 53.
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seeking or enforcing injunctive relief for its SEPs. 196 The Motorola
agreement prohibits the company from seeking or enforcing injunctive
relief anywhere in the world. 197 After these consent agreements were
reached, a number of antitrust or competition authorities around the globe
adopted similar approaches. 198 Similarly, the DOJ’s actions have had
international reach. Just days after the DOJ issued the 2015 BRL, Chinese
enforcers remarked that letter validated its own decisions to disfavor
innovative companies and preference implementers. 199
Of course, this is not just a case of foreign countries looking towards
the United States’ competition enforcement; the IEEE affirmatively
engaged in advocacy abroad with respect to the 2015 IEEE Amendments,
relying heavily on the BRL in their pitch. 200 For example, in meeting with
China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC), IEEE
officials explained that the United States government had approved the
policy and encouraged NRDC officials to launch investigations into
various SEP owners, including Qualcomm, Interdigital, Dolby, Nokia,
HDMI, and Ericsson. 201 Because the United States is rather unique in its
reliance on administrative agencies, other countries often view things like
the BRL as “an authoritative interpretation of [United States’] antitrust
law legalizing buyer cartel behavior towards” innovators. 202
IV.

FOLLOWING THE DOJ’S LEAD TO STRIKE THE RIGHT
BALANCE

“There is a fine balance between honoring the past and losing
yourself in it.” – Eckhart Tolle 203
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Wong-Ervin and Wright specifically point to Canada, China, Korea, and Japan. See also
Alden Abbot, US Government Antitrust Intervention in Standard-Setting Activities & the Competitive
Process, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 225, 246 (2016) (noting that countries such as China and Korea
take cues from enforcement actions in the United States).
199. Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Responses to Questions Submitted for the Record from
Subcommittee Chairman Marino, Before the U.S. House of Representatives, at 2 (August 17, 2017).
200. David L. Cohen, The IEEE 2015 Patent Policy – A Natural Experiment in Devaluing
Technology, KIDON IP BLOG (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.kidonip.com/standard-essentialpatents/the-ieee-2015-patent-policy-a-natural-experiment-in-devaluing-technology/
[https://perma.cc/HW9W-GZHC].
201. Id. These investigations are well-known tools to allow Chinese companies to use western
technology at cheap or near-free rates.
202. See Hoffinger, supra note 151, at 3.
203. Eckhart
Tolle,
On
the
Beauty
of
Today,
OPRAH.COM,
https://www.oprah.com/spirit/Eckhart-Tolle-Writes-About-the-Beauty-of-Today-for-OsAnniversary [https://perma.cc/WUX4-2GW7].
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While the above discussion highlights actions the DOJ and the FTC
have taken that have negatively impacted the balance between
contributors and implementers, there has been a significant change in the
last few years. Specifically, the FTC and the DOJ have taken quite
divergent positions on antitrust policy when it comes to patents and, more
specifically, SEPs. The FTC continues to impede innovation,
collaboration, and competition in the standards development space, while
the DOJ has reversed course and has begun to once again promote
innovation and collaboration as an important part of competition. After
considering these opposite perspectives, this section explains why it is
critical for the DOJ to continue this path and for the FTC to seek balance
and adopt a modern approach. Importantly, as the United States moves
forward under a different administration with new priorities, it is key to
understand why the current DOJ approach is the proper one for achieving
the proper balance between contributors and implementers to foster
innovation, collaboration, and competition.
A. How the DOJ Has Changed Its Course
Despite its historic role in disrupting the balance between contributor
and implementer, the DOJ has recently been walking back from previous
agency policy and remarks regarding patent holdup and royalty
stacking. 204 In November 2017, for example, DOJ Antitrust head Makan
Delrahim expressed skepticism regarding the existence of the “so-called
holdup problem” and noted its “shaky empirical foundations.” 205 Mr.
Delrahim skewered previous efforts of the DOJ and the FTC aimed at
addressing patent holdup as “anathema to the policies underlying the
intellectual property system” and a “serious threat to the innovative
process.” 206
Given the divergence in perspectives from the FTC and DOJ, it is
helpful to think about innovation as being cultivated when both
contributors and implementers are able to invest in and benefit from
technology. The DOJ, it seems, is moving in this direction. For example,
204. Sonia Kuester Pfaffenroth, Peter J. Levitas & Dylan S. Young, DOJ Changing Its Antitrust
Approach to FRAND and SEPs, INTELLECTUAL PROP. & TECH. L.J. (Apr. 2019),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files/perspectives/publications/2019/04/doj-changing-itsantitrust-approach-to-frand.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4FF-47F4].
205. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Take it to the Limit:
Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law at 4 (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download [https://perma.cc/BWH7-6FSP].
206. Id. at 5–7.
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in January 2018, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Andrew Finch,
announced that the DOJ Antitrust Division had “begun scrutinizing what
may appear to be buyer’s cartel or seller’s cartel behavior that’s designed
to artificially shift bargaining leverage from [contributors] to
[implementers] or vice versa. In particular, the Division is focused on
rules of SDOs that purport to clarify the meaning of ‘reasonable and
nondiscriminatory’ but that may instead serve to skew the bargain clearly
in the direction of implementers.” 207 These statements, and others of their
type, go a long way towards reversing the DOJ’s course of harming
contributors in the name of alleged patent holdup and royalty stacking.
Further, the DOJ’s efforts to restore the balance between contributors
and implementers goes beyond just words. In December 2019, the DOJ,
in conjunction with the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO)
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued a
“Joint Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents
Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (2019 Joint Policy
Statement). 208 This document fills a void left when, in December 2018,
Mr. Delrahim withdrew assent from a 2013 Joint Policy Statement
between the DOJ and PTO that advised that injunctions may not be
appropriate with respect to patent infringement of SEPs. 209 In addition to
formally withdrawing the 2013 Joint Policy Statement, the 2019 Joint
Policy Statement makes clear that “a patent owner’s F/RAND
commitment is a relevant factor in determining appropriate remedies, but
need not act as a bar to any particular remedy.” 210 The new Joint Policy
Statement also points out this approach, which rejects a categorical
exclusion of injunctive relief, is consistent with court precedent, including
eBay. 211
Perhaps the most explicit action that illustrates how the DOJ is
walking back from its previous viewpoint about patent holdup and royalty
stacking is the issuance of a new Business Review Letter in 2020. In
September 2020, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim issued a
letter “intended to supplement, update, and append” the 2015 Business
207. See Cohen, supra note 200.
208. Joint Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary
F/RAND Commitments, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & NAT’L. INS.
STANDARDS AND TECH., Dec. 19, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1228016/download
[https://perma.cc/A9UE-9HLR].
209. Makan Delrahim, Remarks at the 19th Annual Berkeley Stanford Advanced Patent Law
Institute, Dec. 7, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makandelrahim-delivers-remarks-19th-annual-berkeley-stanford [https://perma.cc/NLG9-3LSA].
210. See Joint Policy Statement, supra note 208.
211. Id.
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Review Letter that had been issued by the Antitrust Division of the US
Department of Justice (DOJ) to the IEEE. 212 In part, the 2020 letter was
issued because the 2015 letter was “cited, frequently and incorrectly, as
an endorsement of the IEEE policy” and also to explain how US law and
policy has “evolved in important ways over the last five years” in relation
to SEPs. 213 Beyond chastising the IEEE for its mischaracterization of the
2015 DOJ letter, the 2020 DOJ letter explains a variety of legal and policy
developments that have come to the fore over the past five years that
render portions of the 2015 DOJ letter “inaccurate.” 214
As the DOJ notes in the 2020 letter, the 2015 letter had been
misconstrued—and worse, purposefully misapplied—by the IEEE and
others who have tried to harm innovation. Specifically, the IEEE and
others have contended that the 2015 letter was an endorsement of the 2015
IEEE Amendments; rather, the 2015 DOJ letter was simply to announce
that the DOJ would not challenge the proposed 2015 IEEE
Amendments. 215 The DOJ notes further that this misapprehension about
the 2015 DOJ letter has been used by foreign competition authorities in
setting policies around the world, in part based on the IEEE’s advocacy
and characterization of the 2015 DOJ letter. 216
The overarching approach the DOJ has taken in rebalancing the
relationship between contributors and implementers, between competition
and innovation, is what has been named the “New Madison” approach to
the intersection of antitrust and patent law. 217 The DOJ’s “New Madison”
approach includes four principles to ensure innovation, collaboration, and
competition are balanced in standard setting. First, antitrust law should
not be used as a tool to police FRAND commitments; these are contract
issues better remedied in contract. 218 Second SDOs should not become
vehicles for collusive action by implementers (which would reduce
212. Letter from Makan Delrahim Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sophia A.
Muirhead, Gen. Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, Inst. of Electrical and Electronics Eng’rs,
Inc., at 1 (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1315291/download [https://perma.cc/
7J2M-PHHC] [hereinafter “2020 DOJ Letter”].
213. Id.
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 2
216. Id. at 3.
217. Division Update Spring 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/divisionoperations/division-update-spring-2018/antitrust-division-embraces-new-madison-antitrust-andintellectual-property-project [https://perma.cc/ZV59-379F].
218. Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Keynote Address at University of
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(Mar.
16,
2018),
Pennsylvania
Law
School,
U.S.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynoteaddress-university [https://perma.cc/Z7ZG-ZEB6].
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incentives to innovate and encourage patent holdout). 219 Mr. Delrahim has
warned against the “collective exertion of monopsony power” by
implementers, allowing for collective holdout.220 This is especially
problematic because SDO contributors have invested in the research and
development, as well as patenting, even before the standard developments
process has begun, whereas the implementers have little to no sunk
cost. 221 Third, because patent rights include the right to exclude, SDOs
and courts should surpass a high burden before adopting rules that restrict
that right or amount to compulsory licensing. 222Without this principle,
implementers are encouraged to engage in efficient infringement; at
worst, they will be on the hook for the reasonable royalties they should
have paid from the get-go. Fourth, along with this right to exclude,
unilateral and unconditional refusals to license a patent are per se legal
under antitrust. 223 While contract law may require an SEP-holder to deal
with any willing licensee, the Sherman Act should not turn FRAND
commitments into a compulsory licensing scheme.
It is heartening to see the DOJ attempt to restore balance between
contributors and implementers, specifically by rejecting patent holdup and
royalty stacking where there is no evidence of such. More than this, much
of the rest of the world is taking the same position that the existence and
extent of patent holdup and royalty stacking have been exaggerated. For
example, a number of major SDOs have categorically denied that patent
holdup is an issue for their organizations. 224 Further, although the United
States has been slow to question the existence and extent of patent holdup
and royalty stacking, courts in the European Union have been bolder in
their dismantling of these theories. In 2015, the European Court of Justice

219. Id.
220. Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks at the 19th Annual BerkeleyStanford Advanced Patent Law Institute, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks19th-annual-berkeley-stanford [https://perma.cc/ATF6-K3F5].
221. Id.
222. See Delrahim Keynote, supra note 215.
223. Id.
224. Danielle Coffey & Brian Scarpelli, Telecomm. Indus. Ass’n (TIA), Re: Federal Trade
Commission Request for Comments and Announcement of Workshop on Standard-Setting Issues
(Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P11-1204) at 4 (June 14, 2011); Thomas E. Goode, Gen.
Counsel, Alliance for Telecomm. Indus. Solutions, Request for Comments and Announcement of
Workshop on Standard Setting Issues, Project No. P11-1204 at 1 (June 14, 2011); Patricia Griffin,
Vice President and Gen. Counsel, American National Standards Institute, Re: Patent Standards
Workshop, Project No. P11-1204 at 12 (June 21, 2011) (included in Comments of Am. Nat’l
Standards Inst., June 10, 2011, Fed. Trade Comm’n Request for Comments and Announcement of
Workshop on Standard-Setting Issues, Project No. P11-1204).
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issued a landmark decision in Huawei v. ZTE. 225 In this case, the ECJ
clarified the obligations of parties with respect to FRAND negotiations,
noting that if an implementer refused to take a license after an SEP owner
had followed an appropriate set of steps to attempt to license its
technology, the SEP owner was permitted to sue for patent infringement
with the same rights and obligations as any other patent holder.226 In 2020,
a variety of European courts applied the Huawei decision in allowing SEP
owners to hold infringers liable. For example, in Sisvel v. Haier, the
German Federal Court of Justice found that Haier did not act as a willing
licensee and that a FRAND license did not mean simply the lowest price
at which the technology had been offered. 227 In Unwired Planet, the UK
Supreme Court held that SEP owners are entitled to an injunction to
prohibit infringement of SEPs that are found valid and infringed and that
damages are an insufficient remedy.
B. How the FTC Is Persisting in Outdated Ways
While the DOJ has stepped away from blindly accepting that patent
holdup and royalty stacking exist and has altered its treatment of SDOs
and contributors accordingly, the FTC has explicitly held firm in its
views—even as these views are being questioned. For example, in March
2018, Commissioner Terrell McSweeny of the FTC came out against the
DOJ’s shift in his statements “Holding the Line on Patent Holdup: Why
Antitrust Enforcement Matters.” 228 In these remarks, he claimed that over
15 years of scholarship and bipartisan study supported the presumed risks
of patent holdup and that “it would be unfortunate” for the FTC and DOJ
specifically to “question their longstanding support for combatting
holdup.” 229 Commissioner McSweeny supports his position that there is
“ample evidence that patent holdup exists” by pointing to “panelists” who
reported experiencing holdup as well as courts that have found “patent
holders demanding far more than that to which they were entitled.” 230 He
225. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. (C-170/13) (CJEU 2015),
https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/cjeu-decisions/huawei-v-zte [https://perma.cc/BZB3-GDQE].
226. Id.
227. Dr. Henrik Holzapfel & Christian Dolling, Landmark Judgment for German Frand Law
Published: Sisvel v. Haier, MWE BLOG (July 10, 2020), https://www.mwe.com/insights/landmarkjudgment-for-german-frand-law-published-sisvel-v-haier/ [https://perma.cc/2ZBG-GPFK].
228. Statement of Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, Federal Trade Comm’n, Holding the Line
on
Patent
Holdup:
Why
Antitrust
Enforcement
Matters
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1350033/mcsweeny__the_reality_of_patent_hold-up_3-21-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA6D-SZUT].
229. Id.
230. Id.
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claims that these findings are “consistent with holdup.” 231 Yet, while
Commissioner McSweeny relies on many years of scholarship in support
of patent holdup and royalty stacking, he ignores the persuasive, and often
empirically tested, scholarship on the other side. Professor Jonathan
Barnett pointedly addresses this disconnect in his article, “Has the
Academy Led Patent Law Astray?”, questioning the academic narrative
on which Commissioner McSweeny puts his confidence in. 232
Another clear example of the FTC’s failure to come around to the
modern way of thinking is illustrated by the schism between the FTC and
the DOJ regarding the FTC v. Qualcomm case. The FTC’s role in this
pursuing this case is described above; what is interesting is that the DOJ
intervened in this case on Qualcomm’s behalf, favoring innovation over
the outdated positions that the FTC was pressing. On May 2, 2019, the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ took the unusual (unprecedented) step of
submitting a Statement of Interest in the case to take a position contrary
to its sister antitrust enforcement agency. 233 The DOJ argued that, if the
district court were to issue an “overly broad remedy,” it “could result in
reduced innovation, with the potential to harm American consumers.” 234
The FTC, not surprisingly, disagreed with the DOJ’s assessment: and, at
the end of the day, the court agreed with the FTC and issued injunctive
relief against Qualcomm. The DOJ, along with the Departments of
Defense and Energy, stepped in again—in Qualcomm’s favor—when the
case was appealed before the Ninth Circuit.235 Commentators have
remarked that the FTC’s vigorous pursuit of this case is odd. 236 In
particular, one of the primary arguments that the FTC made against
Qualcomm’s licensing program, the duty to deal with one’s competitors,
had been essentially abrogated by the Supreme Court except in certain
circumstances not present here. 237
Not only is the FTC pressing a seriously outdated understanding of
antitrust and patent law, the agency is doing so despite repeated
indications that it is wrong. While the FTC prevailed in front of Judge
231. Id.
232. See Barnett, supra note 102.
233. FTC Statement, supra note 128.
234. Id.
235. Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and
Vacatur, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., (C.A.9 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/1199191/download [https://perma.cc/U39J-UVBU].
236. Geoffrey Manne & Ben Sperry, Why the FTC Had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument
ON
THE
MARKET
BLOG
(Jan.
16,
2020),
Against
Qualcomm,
TRUTH
https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/01/16/why-the-ftc-had-to-abandon-the-duty-to-deal-argumentagainst-qualcomm/ [https://perma.cc/9HK4-V9H5].
237. Id. (noting the FTC had to disclaim this argument on appeal).
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Koh at the district court, this win was nearly immediately called into
question by a panel of the Ninth Circuit that suspected the legitimacy of
Judge Koh’s opinion in staying the injunction. 238 A separate panel of the
Ninth Circuit ruled 3-0 against the FTC. 239 In the midst of these hearings,
the Department of Justice and other administrative agencies weighed in,
all siding with Qualcomm and against the positions taken by the FTC. The
errors of the FTC’s position seem so clear to so many, and yet the agency
persists—even to the point of filing an unsuccessful petition for en banc
review at the Ninth Circuit. 240
C. Why Now is the Moment to Get the Balance Right
Both the FTC and DOJ are responsible for enforcing antitrust laws
in the United States. While at first blush the conflicted relationship
between antitrust and patent law makes perfect sense, these two areas of
law actually have a common goal: increased innovation. Patents provide
a limited monopoly in exchange for innovation; antitrust incentivizes
innovation as one of the axes of competition in which companies can
compete for consumers. Although each of these areas of law may
approach the encouragement of innovation in a different way, they both
have innovation as an end goal. In looking at both the FTC and DOJ’s
recent behavior, particularly in the SDO ecosystem where much
innovation is occurring, it is important that the DOJ’s lead be followed.
Before explaining why the DOJ’s viewpoint should prevail, it is
important to consider whether the agencies’ differing perspectives might,
in fact, be advantageous. As FTC Chairman Joseph Simon noted, in
September 2018, “Consistency across the two federal enforcement
agencies is . . . beneficial,” but that there may be room for “potential
inconsistency” between the FTC and DOJ. Specifically, Simons held on
to the older view: “[W]e also believe that hold-up raises potential antitrust
issues, as well.” Although Simons committed to “economically grounded
and fact-based enforcement of the antitrust laws in this area,” the FTC has
continued to vigorously pursue losing, and unsupported, claims. It would
be beneficial for these agencies to have divergent viewpoints, if it would
be possible for the agencies to learn from each other about what works
and what does not. However, for this learning to occur, the facts would
necessarily need to support, at least in some respects, both viewpoints.
Rather, here, the FTC’s position is based on theory and flies in the face of
238. FTC v. Qualcomm, 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019).
239. FTC v. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
240. FTC v. Qualcomm, Case 19-16122, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2020).
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factual evidence and modern law. For that reason, this is not a situation
where differing opinions may allow for growth and advancement. The
side that is supported by evidence must prevail.
There are at least three primary reasons why now is the time to take
the DOJ’s perspective when considering innovation, collaboration, and
competition in the SDO area. First, as we move forward into the
information economy and pursue the interoperability and
interconnectivity required to support a world based on the Internet of
Things, the importance and utter ubiquity of standardized technology will
continue to grow. Second, the FTC’s erroneous views have thus far had
limited impact outside of the individual cases where it has pursued them;
however, their arguments and perspectives are broad enough that, if
applied more broadly, could have a serious impact beyond these cases and
even beyond standardization generally. Third, given the change in
administration and the fact that new priorities will be driving agency
actions, it is time to clearly consider the reasoning behind the DOJ’s and
the FTC’s divergent viewpoints to settle on a set of priorities that align
with the agencies’ authority over innovation, collaboration, and
competition.
Standards and the SDO activities that support and develop them are
becoming, and will continue to become, more important as the world
shifts further into the technological future and the Internet of Things
becomes dominant. Called the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” or Industry
4.0, the presence of artificial intelligence, connected machines, smart
factories, and more continues to grow and is disrupting nearly every
industry and area of life. 241 The Internet of Things (IoT) has been defined
as “the interconnection via the Internet of computing devices embedded
in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive data.” 242 Some of
these devices include smart watches that track your every activity as well
as your sleep, phone add-ons that serve as breathalyzers or glucose
monitors, smart balls to track your sports performance, connected ovens
and refrigerators, and more. 243 Due to advances in technology and
decreases in pricing of devices, the size of the IoT is growing

241. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrialrevolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ [https://perma.cc/58C2-PNAR].
242. Internet of Things, THE NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine A.
Lindberg, eds., 3d ed. 2010).
243. Scott R. Peppett, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L.REV. 85, 88 (2014) (providing a list of
exemplary devices that form part of the IoT).
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exponentially. 244 Not surprising, given the very nature of IoT,
interconnectivity and interoperability are key features. For this reason,
and its reliance on the internet (which is, itself, standards-based), the list
of standards related to IoT is extensive. 245 Thus, standardization needs to
be supported by recognizing the limitations of the theories of patent
holdup and royalty stacking and seeking to balance the rights of
contributors and implementers in a way that reflects this importance.
The FTC’s current perspective threatens to exceed the limited cases
the agency has brought and may impact standardization, not to mention
innovation more broadly. The FTC fails to recognize there are both
competitive and innovative benefits inherent in SDO participation and
standardized technology. Licensing patents, whether SEP or not, is an
important input to further innovation. In pitting antitrust law against
patent law and accepting (and preferencing) the implementer perspective
over the innovator perspective, the FTC ignores the importance of
innovation as both evidence of and an integral part of competition. As
Professor David Teece sharply noted “Silicon Valley should shudder
because, with the FTC’s approach to market definition, almost all
innovative firms can be accused of monopoly power and have their
business models overturned by the government.” 246 He continues, “[The
FTC] will also damage the global technology market by replacing
negotiation with court determined price regulation not guided in any way
by consideration of the business model and financial returns needed to
draw forth the investment to keep this industry competitive.” 247 Similarly,
the remedies sought by the FTC, and granted by the district court before
being overturned by the Ninth Circuit, were incredibly broad and far
reaching. As Jonathan Barnett noted, the district court’s remedy “would
effectively tear up hundreds of contracts and endanger a patent-based
licensing model that has supported innovation across several generations
of wireless communications technology.” 248 Rather than promoting
244. Arpan Pal, Hemant Kumar Rath, Samar Shailendra & Abhijan Bhattacharyya, IoT
(Mar.
29,
2018),
Standardization:
The
Road
Ahead,
INTECHOPEN
https://www.intechopen.com/books/internet-of-things-technology-applications-andstandardization/iot-standardization-the-road-ahead [https://perma.cc/3BSD-74KS].
245. Id.; Internet of Things Related Standards, IEEE-SA, https://standards.ieee.org/initiatives/
iot/stds.html [https://perma.cc/QD3G-67BF].
246. David Teece, The ‘Naked Tax’ in FTC v. Qualcomm is Patently Absurd, LAW360 (Feb. 1,
2019, 2:29 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1124762/the-naked-tax-in-ftc-v-qualcomm-ispatently-absurd [https://perma.cc/3G9X-8WKR].
247. Id.
248. Jonathan Barnett, Qualcomm ruling a case of antitrust gone wrong, THE HILL (May 28,
2019, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/445777-qualcomm-ruling-a-case-of-antitrustgone-wrong [https://perma.cc/LT3E-V8XB].
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innovation, collaboration, and competition, the remedy pursued by the
FTC is “prone to drive firms to construct ‘walled garden’ ecosystems that
mostly keep their intellectual property to themselves.” 249 Even were 5G
and IoT not the wave of the future, the FTC’s persistent hounding of
contributors who are simply exercising their legitimately granted patent
rights would cause these contributors to scale back their participation in
standards development activities. Because of the necessity of
interoperability and interconnectivity for our future, this unjustified
harassment of contributors will prove devastating.
As a new administration comes into power, the leadership of both the
FTC and the DOJ will change and, not surprisingly, the policies and
priorities of these agencies will also change.250 As the new leaders of these
agencies take office, it would serve innovation, collaboration, and
competition well for their policies and priorities to be based on facts and
evidence, rather than a popular narrative that is at odds with both.
Recognizing the immense benefits that have arisen from standardized
technology, including enhanced innovation and competition, should be a
primary focus for these new agency heads. While the DOJ may have
reached this point first, under Mr. Delrahim’s leadership, it is not too late.
This is the best time for both agencies to recommit to evidence-based
actions that actually support standards development.
V.

CONCLUSION

The technology of the present, and the future, is reliant on
standardization. Not only does standardization allow the most innovative
technologies from a variety of contributors to be considered when solving
a problem, the process of standards development allows these
technologies to be challenged and honed to make them even better.
Moreover, standardization allows for easier entrance into many of these
technology markets, as implementers can rely on the technological
specifications of the standards when developing their products and
services. The standards development arena is thus a hotbed of innovation,
collaboration, and competition—all of which are desirable. For this
reason, the FTC and the DOJ should be encouraging, or at the very least
not impeding, standardization activities. The recent DOJ has recognized
this and has taken steps to walk back some of the harm it inflicted on
249. Id.
250. Caroline Cecot, Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68 DUKE L.J.
1593, 1618 (2019) (“Whenever a new administration gains control of the White House, changes in
regulatory priorities are expected and often desirable.”).
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contributors and SDOs, but the FTC seems to have doubled down and
continues to pursue contributors, alleging anticompetitive behavior, in
ways that are and will continue to harm standardization efforts. At this
moment, given the change in administration and the ever-increasing need
for standardization in today’s (and tomorrow’s technology), it is time to
follow the DOJ’s lead with respect to standards development. Now is the
time to strike the right balance between contributors and implementers.
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